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CITATIONS TO THE RECOld 
Citations to the Record will be abbreviated as follows: 
Record on Appeal 
Trial Transcript 
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Findings of Fact 
Conclusions of Law 
Judgment 
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"F." 
"C." 
"J." 
The Addendum includes the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and the Judgment of the trial court and the decision of the Court 
of Appeals and shall be cited to as "Add." with the page number 
following the Record or Exhibit citation. 
CONTROLLING LAW 
The considerations governing the grant of review of certiorari 
are set forth in Rule 46, Utah R. APP. P.: 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter 
of right, but of judicial discretion, and will 
be granted only for special and important 
reasons. The following, while neither con-
trolling nor wholly measuring the Supreme 
Courtfs discretion, indicate the character of 
reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with a 
decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided a question in state or federal 
law in a way that is in conflict with a 
decision of the Supreme Court; 
-v-
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far de-
parted from the accepted and usual course 
of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower 
court as to call for an exercise of the 
Supreme Court's power of supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal, state, 
or federal law which has not been, but 
should be, settled by the Supreme Court. 
(Emphasis added). 
REPORT OF DECISION 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported in Sciunders v. 
Sharp. 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Ct. App. June 5, 1990) (Add. 48-52). 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Although plaintiffs/petitioners (sometimes collectively "White 
Pine") list three questions as being presented for review, those 
issues can be synthesized into one central issue: Did the Court of 
Appeals correctly hold that White Pine's appeal was simply an 
attempt to relitigate the factual issues determined by the trial 
court in the Sharps1 favor? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Although White Pine asserts a plethora of alleged errors 
committed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in its review 
of that decision, once its motivation in filing a complaint is 
revealed, this case becomes very simple. White Pine was a 
partnership of desperate men who ran out of the dollars needed to 
honor their obligations.1 After years of paying under the parties1 
Contract without complaint, White Pine was forced to invent excuses 
for their non-performance and finally took the startling and 
aggressive posture of filing a Complaint against the Sharps, even 
though it admittedly had failed to pay property taxes, installment 
payments and to provide to the Sharps certain utility connections. 
As the trial court found, these excuses were never mentioned to the 
Sharps until immediately prior to the filing of their Complaint in 
September of 1986: 
1Felton testified "we have this construction loan that's in 
default and we're desperate at this point. Make no mistake about 
it. Everybody's going bankrupt at this point." (Tr. 309, R. 
1643) . 
1 
Significantly, as bearing upon the credibility 
of plaintiffs1 [White Pine's] arguments is the 
fact unrebutted that plaintiffs made no claims 
whatsoever of breach by the Sharps until after 
their own admitted breaches of the Closing 
Documents. 
(F. 53, R. 1342, Add. 17). 
This action arose when White Pine filed a Complaint the day 
before a scheduled Trustee's Sale of certain property located in 
White Pine Canyon, Snyderville, Utah (the "Property"). (R. 2-89, 
F. 95; R. 1352, Add. 27). The Complaint sought to enjoin the 
scheduled Trustee's Sale, alleging inter alia, that the Sharps had 
breached the Contract between the parties2 by failing to release 
Lot 6 and the roadway and 7.35 acres of the unplatted portion of 
the Property. (R. 2-89). 
2The Contract between the parties includes a Memorandum of 
Closing Terms (hereinafter the "Memo") (Ex. 156), a Special 
Warranty Deed (Ex. 17) , a Trust Deed Note together with an Addendum 
to the Trust Deed Note (Ex. 3) and a Trust Deed (Ex. 2) (collec-
tively referred to as "the Contract"). (F. 10, R. 1330, Add. 5). 
The initial draft of a purchase agreement was prepared by counter-
claim defendant, Paul H. Landes, a signatory to the final documents 
composing the parties' Contract. (Ex. 13, Tr. 728, R. 1645). 
Although White Pine claims, on page 3 of its Petition that the 
Contract was prepared by the Sharps' attorney, Jon C. Heaton, in 
fact, the parties extensively negotiated the terms of the contract. 
(Tr. 556, R. 1644). For instance, four drafts of the Earnest Money 
were discussed. (Tr. 729-730, R. 1645) . The rule of construction 
that ambiguity in a contract is construed against its drafter is 
inapplicable where such contract is the result of extensive 
negotiations between the parties. Centennial Enter, v. Mansfield 
Dev. Co.. 568 P.2d 58 (Colo. 1977). Additionally, the rule only 
functions after the court has considered all pertinent extrinsic 
evidence and is still uncertain as to the contract's interpreta-
tion. Wilburn v .Interstate Elec. , 748 P.2d 582 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) . 
2 
The case arose against the following background. The Property 
was purchased with a down payment at closing and a promise to make 
five annual installments payable on June 30 of each subsequent year 
in the amount of $192,611.06 principal, together with accrued 
interest. (Ex. 3). The Property was intended to be promptly 
developed as a Planned Unit Development ("PUD") into twelve 4 or 5 
acre lots, with an internal roadway dedicated to public use. (F. 
5, R. 1329, Add. 4, Ex. 14 and 39). The dedication of the roadway 
was of such vital importance to the parties that an initial plat 
was attached as Exhibit "A" to the Memo. (F. 14 and 19, R. 1331, 
1333, Add. 6, 8, Ex. 15). Paragraph 5 of the Memo further provides 
that "changes in the proposed plat and the Declaration of Cove-
nants, Conditions and Restrictions when prepared shall be subject 
to the reasonable approval of the Seller [the Sharps]." (F. 18, R. 
1332-33, Add. 7-8, Ex. 15). The Sharps were concerned that, in the 
event of default, they possessed access to the Property (Tr. 749-
750, R. 1645) and Robert Felton ("Felton") , one of the general 
partners of White Pine, knew the Sharps "wanted the right to 
approve them [any changes] reasonably." (Tr. 138, R. 1642). 
The Memo also provided after "the recordation of a PUD Plat 
and Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions" ("CCRs") 
that White Pine would be entitled to the release of three PUD lots 
of its "choice together with said roadway" described in the 
proposed plat attached as Exhibit f A. • (F. 17, R. 1332, Add. 7, 
Ex. 15)(emphasis added). For each $140,000.00 in principal paid 
3 
thereafter and after recordation of the PUD, White Pine "shall be 
entitled to the release of one (1) lot of Buyer's choice,." (F. 15 
and 16, R. 1331-32, Add. 6-7, Ex. 15)(emphasis added). The Memo 
further provided the Sharps were entitled to one sewer connection 
and one culinary water connection in the PUD system for "a 
connection fee and service fee equal to the pro rata cost to the 
purchaser of a lot." (F. 22, R. 1334, Add. 9, Ex. 15).3 
White Pine first defaulted on its June 30, 1983 payment, which 
default was subsequently cured in November of 1983. (F. 27, R. 
1336, Add. 11, Ex. 22; F. 31, R. 1337, Add. 12, Ex. 4 and 44). In 
December of 1983, White Pine, with the written consent of the 
Sharps, recorded a plat, which platted only a portion of the 
Property, instead of the entire Property as originally intended. 
(F. 39-40, R. 1339, Add. 14, Ex. 51). The plat also differed from 
White Pine's original intent by including an Owner's Dedication for 
a private roadway in the PUD. (F. 19, R. 1333, Add. 8, Ex. 39; F. 
34, R. 1337, Add. 12, Ex. 1). The Sharps were concerned about 
access to the Property in the event they were required to take it 
3In both their Brief filed with the Court of Appeals and their 
Petition, White Pine failed to address the trial court's finding 
that they also breached the Contract "by failing to make available 
[to the Sharps who still owned adjoining lands] sewer and water 
connections at the same charge to purchasers of a PUD lot." (F. 
100, R. 1354, Add. 29). Although construction primarily commenced 
in 1983 for the sewer and water systems, neither was completed or 
operational at the time of trial, nor had the sewer construction 
been approved by the Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District 
("SBSID"). (F. 82, R. 1349-50, Add. 24-25, Ex. 83, 83(a), 99-108). 
4 
back in a foreclosure. (Tr. 748-750, R. 1645). Had the entire 
Property been platted as originally contemplated, access would not 
have been an issue since if the Sharps took it back in a foreclo-
sure sale, they would be owners and purchasers of PUD lots 
entitling them to access under the CCRs recorded. (Tr. 757-759, R. 
1645). Had the roadway remained public, their access also would 
have been assured. Accordingly, at the time the Sharps were asked 
to approve the plat and the CCRs, their continued right of access 
was confirmed with White Pine both orally and in writing (F. 35-39, 
R. 1338-39, Add. 13-14, Ex. 25, 25(a), 26, 26(a)). 
White Pine again defaulted under the terms of the Contract in 
November of 1984 by failing to pay all of the property taxes due. 
The 1984 taxes and all subsequent property taxes remained unpaid 
($20,368.62) through the time of trial. (F. 48-49, R. 1341, Add. 
16). The taxes were only paid on January 13, 1989 when the trial 
court, as a condition of approving the plaintiffs1 supersedeas 
bond, ordered the plaintiffs to pay them. (R. 1687-1691). White 
Pine further defaulted under the terms of the Contract by failing 
to make all of the June 30, 1985 installment payment (only 
$59,709.47 was paid) and the remaining installment payment due 
under the Contract in 1986. (F. 50, R. 1342, Add. 17, Ex. 44). 
The Sharps recorded a Notice of Default on September 16, 1985. 
(F. 51, R. 1342, Add. 17, Ex. 55). After White Pine received the 
Notice of Default, Felton assured the Sharps "every attempt is 
being made to resolve the problem [of our non-payment]." (F. 52, 
5 
R. 1342, Add. 17, Ex. 31). As the trial court found: "No written 
or oral claim of default on the part of the Sharps under the 
Closing Documents was made by the plaintiffs until February 27, 
1986, subsequent to plaintiffs' own defaults." (F. 71, R. 1347, 
Add. 22, Ex. 35; Tr. 200-201, R. 1643). Nor did White Pine request 
the release of Lot 6 and the roadway until long after their own 
defaults under the Contract.4 
Judge Frederick held White Pine had materially breached the 
Contract and the Sharps had substantially complied with its terms. 
(F. 48, 50, 53, 57, 100, R. 1341-43, 1354, Add. 16-18, 29). 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reviewed the issues presented 
by plaintiffs, concluding that "Buyers are essentially challenging 
the trial court's findings of fact" and the legal issues raised by 
the appellants "strike at the trial court's determination of 
whether there was a material breach of contract and if so, when, 
and by whom." Saunders v. Sharp. 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 68, 69-70 
(Utah Ct. App. May 25, 1990, Add. 48-52). White Pine's Petition 
for Rehearing was denied June 26, 1990. 
4The district court found that "Plaintiffs' first requests" 
for release of Lot 6 and the roadway were "February 27, 1986 and 
May 7, 1986, respectively." (F. 59, R. 1343-1344, Add. 18-19). 
Also, White Pine did not request the release of 7.35 acres of the 
unplatted property until February 27, 1986. Id. The Contract, 
however, specifically provides that only "PUD lots" are to be 
released. Id. As the district court found, "[a]s of these dates, 
plaintiffs [White Pine] were still and are in of [sic] default." 
Id. 
6 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Most of the omissions and misstatements of fact in plaintiffs' 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari ("Petition") relate entirely to 
their claim the Court of Appeals failed to address certain 
allegedly pure issues of law which they had raised. Plaintiffs 
claim they are arguing only matters of law, citing to various 
"undisputed" facts which form the foundation to their arguments. 
These facts, however, instead of being "undisputed," were actually 
resolved against them by the District Court. The Court of Appeals 
clearly saw through plaintiffs' veil, holding that "we are [not] 
thus obliged to consider the . . . evidence . . . from 'appellants' 
view of the way he or she believes the facts should have been 
found.'"5 Saunders at 70. 
White Pine's attack upon the District Court's legal conclu-
sions must fail when contrasted with the factual issues which were 
resolved against them at trial. Due to space limitations and to 
avoid redundancy, those facts pertaining to White Pine's claimed 
5Further evidence of White Pine's efforts to relitigate the 
factual findings of the trial court can be found in their citations 
to the Record. The vast majority of their citations are solely to 
the testimony of the plaintiffs. The only Findings of Fact of the 
trial court cited by plaintiffs are in those instances concerning 
the background of the case about which there never has been any 
dispute, such as quotations of the language from the Contract, the 
fact that the Property was conveyed by the Sharps, and the fact 
that the deeds and the plat were recorded with the Summit County 
Recorder. All of the trial court's Findings of Fact relating to 
the issues of who breached and when the breach occurred are totally 
disregarded by the plaintiffs. 
7 
legal issues will be correctly set forth herein under Point I of 
the Sharps1 Argument. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
PLAINTIFFS1 "LEGAL ISSUES" ARE SIMPLY 
ATTEMPTS TO RELITIGATE THE FACTS 
FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT AGAINST THEM. 
White Pine sets forth seven alleged "legal issues" on page 9 
of its Petition which, it contends, the Court of Appeals failed to 
address. In the first alleged "legal issue," White Pine claims the 
Court of Appeals failed to address the argument the Sharps 
"breached the parties1 Contract by failing to reconvey property 
under the Trust deed (sic) . . . [for which they] had [been] paid 
. . . . " This argument, as well as all the remaining arguments, 
must fail when an examination is made of the trial court's 
findings. 
White Pine claims it satisfied all conditions to a release of 
7.35 acres of the unplatted Property. Plaintiffs' Petition, p. 5. 
However, the parties' Contract specifically provides only for the 
release of platted PUD lots. The Memo provided: 
Upon the recordation of the PUD plat and 
Declaration of Covenants. Conditions and 
Restrictions with the Summit County Recorder. 
Buyer shall be entitled to the release from 
the Deed of Trust of three (3) PUD lots of 
Buyer's choice together with the said roadway 
. . . . 
(Emphasis added.) (F. 17, R. 1332, Add. 7, Ex. D15). 
White Pine also asserts, on page 5 of its Petition, that it 
8 
satisfied all conditions on December 23, 1983 to the release of 
five lots and the roadway. Lots 1-5, however, were reconveyed.6 
Plaintiffs1 argument regarding the roadway, which is also the 
subject of their second and seventh "legal issues," also must fail 
since it ignores the trial court's finding that execution by the 
Sharps of the Consent to Record constituted a release of the 
roadway pursuant to the language of the plat and CCRs which 
"reserved a non-exclusive easement for utilities and vehicular and 
pedestrian access over the private roadway . . . •"7 (F. 39, R. 
1339, Add. 14). Felton himself acknowledged in a letter to Heaton 
that "the deeds for the roads [sic] may be difficult to do." (F. 
44, R. 1340, Add. 15, Ex. 30). The Sharps were never presented 
with a document in recordable form releasing the roadway from the 
Trust Deed. Felton testified that "Associated Title probably" 
would be the one to prepare the reconveyance. (Tr. 178) . 
^hite Pine, on page 6 of its Petition, implies that because 
a partial reconveyance covering Lots 1-5 was not recorded until 
nearly two years later, the Sharps are, somehow, responsible. The 
Sharps, however, directed the Trustee, Associated Title to reconvey 
the lots on January 18, 1984, shortly after plaintiffs requested 
the release. (F. 42, R. 1340, Add. 15, Ex. 28). The Partial 
Reconveyance was not prepared by Associated Title until January 7, 
1986, or recorded until March 26, 1986. (F. 43, R. 1340, Add. 15, 
Ex. 45). No explanation of the delay was provided at trial. 
Associated Title, named by the plaintiffs as a defendant in the 
action, was never served by plaintiffs and did not appear at trial. 
(F. 43, R. 1430, Add. 15). 
7After recordation of the plat, the CCRs and the Consent to 
Record, plaintiffs proceeded without hesitation to construct the 
roadway and other improvements on the Property (F. 41, R. 1340, 
Add. 15). 
9 
Additionally, it ignores the finding that the parties subsequently 
modified their Contract to allow the Sharps access across the 
internal roadway in consideration of the Sharps1 consenting to the 
recordation of a plat platting only one-half of the Property.8 (F. 
39, R. 1338, Add. 14). Further, plaintiffs1 contention, on page 6 
of their Petition, that the Sharps never released the roadway is 
directly contrary to the trial court's finding that the Sharps gave 
repeated assurances, before and after trial, to White Pine they did 
not intend to interfere through their foreclosure with White Pine's 
8White Pine in footnote 3 on page 14 of its Petition cites to 
its Court of Appeals Reply Brief in which it claimed there is no 
evidence White Pine agreed to an easement before the Sharps 
executed the Consent to Record. This assertion ignores the 
testimony of attorney Jon Heaton, accepted by the trial court. On 
November 18, 1983, Mr. Heaton prepared a letter to the Sharps as an 
embodiment of the representations White Pine was making or willing 
to make to the Sharps to secure their consent to the final plat. 
(Tr., 751, R. 1645). The letter indicated: 
At a later time in the near future Hy [Saunders] has 
indicated he will seek release of Lots 1 through 5 of the 
platted subdivision along with his road (White Pine 
L a n e ) . . . . When those releases are made pursuant to 
your [the Sharps'] instruction we will ensure that rights 
are reserved in White Pine Lane for access for the 
southern portions of the property purchased from you 
until your Deed of Trust is fully paid. 
(F. 35, R. 1338, Add. 13, Ex. 25 and 25(a)). On November 21, 1983, 
Felton wrote Heaton a reply in which he stated "[i]t is perfectly 
acceptable to us [White Pine] that he [Mr. Sharp] retain an 
easement over Whit Pine Lane to the southern part of his property 
as well as to Lot 6 from White Pine Canyon Road up to the western 
boundary of Lot 6." (F. 36, r. 1338, Add. 13, Ex. 26). Heaton 
noted in the margin of a copy of the letter that Felton agreed 
"access over road [White Pine Lane] retained if Sharp develops 
undeveloped property Lots 7-12 White Pine Ranch." (F. 37, R. 1338, 
Add. 13, Ex. 26(a)). 
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access and utility easements9 (F. 88, R. 1351, Add. 26; see, also, 
Ex. 33, Tr. 22-25, 27-28, 43, R. 164). 
White Pine finally asserts, on page 5 of its Petition, that it 
satisfied all conditions by June 30, 1984, to the release of Lot 6. 
This claimed fact is also the fourth "legal issue" relating to 
their failure to request a reconveyance. Such an argument ignores 
the specific language of the Contract requiring a "choice" by the 
Buyer (F. 16, 17, 61, R. 1332, 1344, Add. 7, 19) and the trial 
court's finding that the parties1 course of conduct established the 
practice of requesting a reconveyance.10 (F. 47, R. 1341, Add. 
9A1though White Pine claims, on page 7 of its Petition, that 
the Sharps sought to foreclose the roadway, all notices of default 
and notices of trustee's sale subsequently recorded against the 
subject Property specifically provided that the notices were 
SUBJECT TO easements, encroachments, restrictions, rights 
of way and matters of record enforceable in law [sic] 
equity. 
(F. 56, R. 1343, Add. 18, Ex. 5, 36, 55, 56 and 58). 
10White Pine asserts, at page 12 of its Petition, that the 
Contract is unambiguous and its interpretation is therefore a 
question of law. However,if a trial court finds facts respecting 
the intentions of the parties based on extrinsic evidence, review 
is strictly limited. Kimball v. Campbell (cited by plaintiffs), 
699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). This Court has consistently held 
that the meaning and intent of an agreement can be determined from 
the course of conduct and the action and performance of the parties 
to the agreement. Zeese v. Estate of Siecrel. 534 P.2d 85 (Utah 
1975); Bullfrog Marina. Int. v. Lentz. 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972). 
Additionally, the issue of whether a contract has been modified is 
a question of fact. Coonrod & Walz Const. Co. Inc. v. Motel 
Enterprises. Inc. . 217 Kan. 63, 535 P.2d 971 (1975); Resource Enq. 
Inc. v. Siler. 94 Idaho 935, 500 P.2d 836 (1972). Finally, where 
several documents are executed simultaneously and are clearly 
interrelated, they must be construed together and harmonized if 
possible. Atlas Corp. v. Cloves Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 
11 
16) . 
White Pine's assertion, on page 7, that only one platted lot, 
Lot 6, remained to be released, therefore, requiring no choice 
ignores the evidence on which the trial court based its Findings. 
White Pine was "land banking." That is, White Pine delayed 
recording a final plat because "[a]s soon as we file the plat, real 
estate taxes are going to go up significantly, which we would like 
to avoid until we have an actual buyer for one of the lots." (F. 
28, R. 1336, Add. 11, Ex. 23). White Pine wanted to keep open its 
options as to the unplatted acreage, later requesting by letter the 
approval by the Sharps of a "multi-family development." (F. 45, R. 
1340-41, Add. 15-16, Ex. 29). Accordingly, White Pine "may have 
chosen to prepare a plat of the then unplatted acreage and seek a 
release of a portion of it instead of Lot 6." (F. 61, R. 1344, 
Add. 19).11 
White Pine's third "legal issue" that the district court 
concluded "[t]he Sharps breach of contract was legally excused by 
their reliance on advice of counsel" is simply a misstatement of 
the ruling of the trial court. The trial court found only that the 
Sharps' reliance on the advice of counsel was in good fciith and a 
defense to the statutory cause of action for failure to reconvey 
1987). 
11As Felton testified: "Wait a minute, wait a minute. * * * 
I do believe the contract says lots of the buyer's choice and that 
would require a choice." (F. 61, R. 1344, Add. 19; Tr. 34, R. 
1643) . 
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asserted by plaintiffs under Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-33. (F. 
91, R. 1351, Add. 26; C. 23-24, R. 60, Add. 35). The Sharps never 
urged this defense except in reference to that statute.12 
"Legal issue" number five wherein White Pine alleges the trial 
court erred by concluding it was not entitled to the legal remedy 
of specific performance relates back to the factual underpinnings 
of the first "legal issue," that is, issues of breach. A party to 
a contract, however, is not entitled to specific performance if he 
is, himself, in breach. Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Utah 
1974); LHIW Inc. v. DeLorean. 753 P.2d 961 (Utah 1988). It was the 
specific finding of the trial court that it was the plaintiffs who 
were in breach of the Contract. (F. 53, R. 1342, Add. 17). 
White Pine argues as its sixth "legal issue" that the trial 
court erred in determining White Pine breached the Contract by 
failing to pay approximately $3,200.00 in property taxes even 
though it had paid $1,500,000.00 to the Sharps. This argument 
ignores the fact that the Trust Deed requires the trustor (plain-
tiffs) to "pay at least ten days before delinquency all taxes and 
assessments affecting said property" (F. 48, R. 1341, Add. 16, Ex. 
2) and the failure to pay real estate taxes is a material default 
precluding a release of property from a mortgage. City Bank 
Farmers Trust Co. v. Hickman. 164 Misc. 234, 297 N.Y.S. 592, 595 
1 zJudge Frederick also found that the Sharps did request a 
reconveyance of Lots 1-5 from the trustee (F. 42, R. 1340, Add. 15, 
Ex. 30) . 
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(Sup. Ct. 1937); Clason's Point Land Co. v. Swartz. 237 A.D. 741, 
262 N.Y.S. 756, 760 (App. Div. 1933); Markovitz v. Republic 
National Bank, 651 F.2d 825, 827 (2nd Cir. 1981). 
White Pine seems to imply on page 6 of its Petition that 
because there was no assertion of default regarding the failure of 
plaintiffs to pay the property taxes, somehow, their obligation to 
pay those taxes disappeared. A breach is a breach, however, at the 
time it occurs, regardless of whether the non-breaching party seeks 
to enforce the agreement. Biork v. April Indus., 547 P.2d 219 
(Utah 1976), appeal after remand, 560 P.2d 315, cert, den. 97 S.Ct. 
2634, 431 U.S. 930, 50 L.Ed.2d 2456 (Damages began to accrue once 
defendant breached agreement. Plaintiffs not required to take 
steps to enforce agreement); see Ouin Blair Enter, v. Julien Const. 
Co.. 597 P.2d 945 (Wyo. 1979)(Parties free to ignore provisions of 
contract but must understand that they bear the consequences of 
such disregard when breach becomes fact of life). 
Further, White Pine failed to pay any subsequent assessments 
of yearly property taxes (totaling $20,368.62 at the time of 
trial). (F. 48-49, R. 1341-42, Add. 16-17). It also failed to pay 
the total amount due on the 1985 installment payment and failed to 
pay any portion of the 1986 installment payment. (F. 50, R. 1342, 
Add. 17) . Although White Pine attempts to exploit the amounts paid 
under the Addendum to the Promissory Note, it omits to disclose the 
fact that Judgment was rendered against it in the amount of 
$726,784.67 as of September 26, 1988 and interest has been accruing 
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since then on the principal alone in the per diem amount of 
$183.32. (J. p. 3, Add. 42). White Pine further neglects to 
address the trial court's finding that plaintiffs also breached the 
parties1 Contract by failing to make available sewer and water 
connections at the same charge to purchasers of a PUD lot. (F. 
100, R. 1354, Add. 29) .13 
As demonstrated above, plaintiffs have sought to conjure up 
purported "legal issues" when, in fact, they have ignored or 
misstated the factual findings of the trial court. The special and 
important reasons for which a petition for a writ of certiorari 
should be granted ought not include a petitioner's attempted 
relitigation of the facts. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION 
OF WHETHER THERE WAS A MATERIAL BREACH 
OF CONTRACT CONSTITUTES AN ISSUE OF 
FACT FOR THE FACT FINDER. 
Petitioners argue that the decision of the Court of Appeals is 
13Plaintiffs make the claim, at page 5 of its Petition, that 
it constructed improvements at a cost of $1,063,348.10 "benefiting 
all of the Property . . . ." The water and sewer systems, however, 
were not completed or operational at the time of trial nor had the 
sewer system been improved for use. (F. 82, R. 1349-50, Add. 24-
25) . Further, plaintiffs previously sued Summit County, the SBSID 
and various officials thereof because "the imposition of the 
requirement that plaintiffs construct an off-site sewer approxi-
mately one mile in length" means "the costs of developing the 
entire project became prohibitive." (F. 67, R. 1346, Add. 21, Ex. 
116) . In the SBSID litigation, plaintiffs blamed these defendants 
for the threatened foreclosure (F. 69, R. 1346-47, Add. 21-22) and 
claimed most of the "same damages they sought to recover from the 
Sharps in the present case." (F. 70, R. 1347, Add. 22). 
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contrary to the proposition set forth in Avaikos v. Lowry. 54 Utah 
217, 179 P 988 (919), where this Court held: "Twlhere the facts 
are undisputed, the question of whether or not they constitute a 
performance or breach of the contract is one of law for the Court." 
Id. at 990 (quoting 13 C.J. 790, paragraph 1011). (Emphasis 
added.) The converse proposition, however, has also been recog-
nized in Schick v. Ashton, 7 Utah 2d 152, 320 P.2d 664, where this 
Court held "whether a promisor has made and kept his promise is a 
jury question where the evidence is in conflict." (Emphasis 
added.) Id. at 665. See also Commercial Security Bank v. Hodson, 
18 Utah 2d 388, 393 P.2d 482 (1964) (Issue of whether bank entered 
into contract and whether it breached such contract are questions 
for the jury). 
In the instant case, the facts are not only disputed, but have 
been hotly contested from the outset through the briefing on 
appeal. The trial court entered 104 extensive Findings of Fact 
after White Pine submitted and argued 132 pages of objections. (R. 
926-1028) . Since the facts are clearly disputed, Avaikos. the case 
cited by the petitioners as the only controlling Utah authority, is 
inapposite to this case and the standards set forth in the Schick 
and Commercial Security Bank cases should control. 
The questions of who breached and when that breach occurred 
are to be determined by the fact finder. Here, Judge Frederick 
made the factual determination that White Pine breached the 
Contract and the Sharps did not, a finding that may not be set 
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aside unless clearly erroneous. Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball, 786 
P.2d 760 (Utah 1990); Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 52(a). 
The following language in Schick v. Ashton is apt in the 
context of White Pine's Petition: 
Plaintiffs urge that defendants violated their 
contract as a matter of law. Apparently 
plaintiffs base such contention on facts 
related in their brief which are most favor-
able to their own position. But such conten-
tion does not square with the familiar and 
oft-repeated principal that on review the 
evidence will be canvassed in a light most 
favorable to the approval of the jury's ver-
dict. 
Schick v. Ashton. 320 P.2d at 665. 
Ill 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY APPLIED 
THE MARSHALLING DOCTRINE. 
In Scharf v. BMG Corp. . 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), a 
case relied on heavily by plaintiffs, this Court set forth the 
former standard to be applied in reviewing the findings of fact 
made by a trial court, taking as a 
starting point the trial courtfs findings and 
not Erickson's [appellant's] recitations of 
the facts. To mount a successful attack on 
the trial court's findings of fact, an appel-
lant must marshall all the evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings and then demon-
strate that even viewing it in the light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the finding. (Cita-
tions omitted). 
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 1070. 
The standard of review has been amended subsequent to the 
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Scharf decision and now sets forth a new, stronger standard of 
review. 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
(Emphasis added.) Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P. 
Here, as noted by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners 
"failed to demonstrate that the findings are against the clear 
weight of the evidence." Saunders, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 70. 
(Add. 50). The Court then concluded, correctly under the marshal-
ling doctrine, that the findings of fact as determined by the trial 
court must be accepted as valid. 
Appellants argue the Court of Appeals failed to examine White 
Pine's "legal arguments" irrespective of White Pine's failure to 
marshall, a duty "implicit in all the marshalling cases." 
Plaintiffs' Petition at page 15. Plaintiffs' argument, however, 
disregards the language of the Court of Appeals implicitly stating 
that those issues of law had been examined and rejected. In 
beginning its analysis of the breach of contract issues raised on 
appeal, the Court of Appeals took note of the appellants' claim 
their issues on appeal were questions of law and concluded "after 
scrutinizing those issues, that buyers are essentially challenging 
the trial court's findings of fact." (Emphasis added.) Saunders 
at 69. (Add. 49). Additionally, courts are not obligated to 
examine every issue raised by an appellant but will affirm the 
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decision of the trial court whenever it can do so on a proper 
ground even if it was not the ground on which the trial court 
relied,u Bill Nav & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Const, Co. . 677 
P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984). 
Further, plaintiffs1 Petition is nearly identical to the 
Petition for Rehearing filed by plaintiffs in the Court of Appeals, 
in which plaintiffs advanced the same claim that their "legal 
arguments" had not been analyzed. The denial of plaintiffs1 
Petition for Rehearing is a further indication by the Court of 
Appeals that White Pine's claimed "legal arguments" had been 
examined and found to be without merit. See. In Re; Shirk's 
Estate. 194 Kan. 671# 401 P.2d 297 (1965) (Motion for rehearing 
denied where motion presents "no issue not fully considered and 
determined in original opinion" (Emphasis added.)) 
CONCLUSION 
The questions of breach of contract and substantial perfor-
mance are questions of fact where the evidence is in dispute. The 
Court of Appeals examined the claimed "legal issues" raised by the 
appellants and concluded, after scrutiny, that they were factually 
based and without merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals was 
in accord with case law as established by decisions of the Court of 
14If, as White Pine argues, appellate courts have a duty to 
examine every single issue raisedf the appellate process would be 
reduced to an issue raising contest which rewards appellants, like 
the instant ones, who presented more than two dozen argument 
headings in their Brief in the Court of Appeals. 
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Appeals and this Court and is not such a departure from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require 
this Court to exercise its power of supervision. A writ of 
certiorari is to be granted only for special and important reasons, 
not for the redetermination of factual issues. For the reasons 
stated above, White Pine's Petition should be denied. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT 
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; WHITE PINE RANCHES, 
a Utah general partnership; 
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a 
Utah general partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE 
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP, 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT FELTON; LEON H. 
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; KENNETH R. NORTON dba 
INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC., 
nnm 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C87-1621 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
and PAUL H. LANDES, indivi-
dually; WHITE PINE RANCHES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
This cause came on for trial before the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick on January 28, 1988 through January 29, 
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the de-
fendants John C. and Geraldine Y. Sharp (hereinafter the 
"Sharps'1) appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A. F. 
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac 
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enter-
prises, Leon H. Saunders (hereinafter "Saunders"), Robert 
Felton (hereinafter "Felton"), J, Richard Rees and Saunders 
Land Investment Corporation appearing by counsel Robert M. 
Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord. Counterclaim 
defendant Kenneth R. Norton ("Norton") appeared through his 
counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and 
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim 
defendant Norton. Defendant Associated Title was never served 
in this action. Counterclaim defendant Paul H. Landes (here-
inafter "Landes") was never served in this action. 
The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, hav-
ing reviewed and received exhibits, having heard the arguments 
of counsel, having received stipulations of counsel, having 
reviewed memoranda presented by counsel, having presented its 
oral ruling on the issues involved in the case- on March 30, 
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1988, having heard and ruled upon the Plaintiffs' Objections 
to Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Plaintiffs' Proposed Alternate and Additional Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and upon Plaintiffs' Objection 
to Affidavit in Support of Request for Attorneys' Fees (in-
cluding a similar motion filed by Norton) on September 16, 
1988, and for good cause appearing, hereby makes and enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about December 9, 1980, Leon H. Saunders, 
Robert Felton, Norton and Paul H. Landes entered into an Ear-
nest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase (hereinafter "Earnest 
Money") with the Sharps for the purchase of certain real prop-
erty located in White Pine Canyon, Snyderville, Summit County, 
State of Utah (hereinafter "the Subject Property"). (Exhibit 
14). 
2. Plaintiffs' "development plans presently anticipated 
12 to 15 four-acre to five-acre lots" and the Earnest Money 
provided "such plans shall be subject to the reasonable 
approval of Seller [the Sharps]." 
3. The Earnest Money also provided, inter alia: 
At a time desired by Seller, Purchaser 
shall allow Seller to hook into the 
culinary water system and sewer system 
developed by Purchaser on the subject 
Property at the same per-hook-up price 
charged by Purchaser to the buyers of 
lots developed on the subject Property. 
4. The plaintiffs acted upon the understanding that be-
fore Summit County would approve any planned development, 
-3- ooon 
they, as the developer, must provide to Summit County for 
approval an environmental impact statement, a plat map and, if 
a planned residential development, a declaration of protective 
covenants. The Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District 
("SBSID") required all sewer design improvements be approved 
and construction must receive final approval. 
5. Plaintiffs wanted to promptly develop the Subject 
Property and anticipated the approval process would be com-
pleted by June, 1981. 
6. Prior to closing the transaction which was the sub-
ject of the Earnest Money, a Shared Water System Cost Estimate 
was prepared for Saunders by J. J. Johnson & Associates, engi-
neers in Park City. The Estimate proposed two alternatives 
wherein 15 units at Saunders Ranch (subsequently White Pine 
Ranches), known herein as the "Subject Property", develop a 
water system sufficient for its needs and the needs of various 
adjacent properties in order to provide users of the water 
system an economy of scale resulting in lower water system 
costs to each user. (Exhibit 105). Although considered by 
him, Saunders never adopted any of these proposals. 
7. In April, 1981, an Environmental Impact Statement 
(hereinafter "EIS") was prepared by J. J. Johnson for Saunders 
Land Investment Corporation concerning development of the Sub-
ject Property and was delivered to the Sharps prior to clos-
ing. (Exhibit 67). 
8. The EIS provided the "sewer system will be connected 
to the Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District and a line 
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extension agreement with the Sewer Improvement District will 
be signed-" The EIS also provided two alternative water stor-
age systems for the development on the Subject Property which 
would be available to other proposed developments, including 
Ranch Place and Landmark Plaza, as well. The EIS further pro-
vided that the internal traffic circulation in the subject 
project would be via private road. 
9. In April 1981, Felton, Norton, Saunders and Landes 
operated under the assumed name of White Pine Ranches-
(Plaintiffs' Complaint, H I and 5). 
10. Thereafter, on or about July 16, 1981, the parties 
closed the sale of the Subject Property through the execution 
of a Memorandum of Closing Terms (Exhibit 15) executed by 
Saunders, Felton, Norton, Landes and the Sharps; a Special 
Warranty Deed (Exhibit 17) executed by the Sharps and convey-
ing the title to the Subject Property to Landes, Felton, 
Saunders and Interstate Rentals, Inc.; a Trust Deed Note ex-
ecuted by Felton, Saunders, Landes, Norton and Interstate 
Rentals, Inc. by its president, Norton, in the amount of 
$963,055.30, together with an addendum to the Trust Deed Note 
(Exhibit 3) outlining the Schedule of payments, and a Trust 
Deed covering the Subject Property executed by Saunders, 
Landes, Felton and Interstate Rentals, Inc. by its president, 
Norton, and securing the Trust Deed Note (Exhibit 2) (herein-
after collectively referred to as "the Closing Documents"). 
11. A partnership agreement establishing White Pine 
Ranches was executed September 25, 1982 with Felton, Saunders, 
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Dan Hunter and J. Richard Rees as general partners. (Exhibit 
49). Saunders Land Investment Corporation subsequently as-
sumed and bought out the interest of Dan Hunter in the White 
Pine Ranches partnership. 
12. On June 30, 1982 White Pine Ranches and Howells In-
vestment executed a Partnership Agreement of White Pine Enter-
prises for the purposes of "investing in, managing, leasing, 
developing, subdividing and selling unimproved real estate 
(Exhibit 48) described on Exhibit rA' attached" thereto, which 
unimproved real estate was the approximately 27 southern acres 
of the Subject Property that was never platted. 
13. Both partnerships, White Pine Ranches and White Pine 
Enterprises, are general partnerships. 
14. Preliminary plats (Exhibits 18 and 19) of the Sub-
ject Property were prepared by J. J. Johnson & Associates for 
the development prior to closing, but were modified by plain-
tiffs because the County Commission was opposed to the private 
road concept. (Exhibit 109). These preliminary plats were 
not approved prior to closing because the County Attorney 
would not approve a private road system (Exhibit 114). A new 
plat was prepared for White Pine Ranches, a Planned Unit De-
velopment ("PUD") and attached as Exhibit "A" to the Memo-
randum of Closing Terms. This Exhibit "A" to the Memorandum 
of Closing Terms platted all of the Subject Property and was 
initialed by all the parties thereto except Felton. (Exhibit 
20). 
15. Paragraph 1 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms (Ex-
hibit 15) provided as follows: 
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1. It is mutually agreed and 
understood that after recordation of 
the PUD Plat and the Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, 
and upon receipt of each $140,000-00 in 
principal (but not including the 
earnest money and down payment money), 
Seller shall execute and deliver to 
Buyer a Partial Deed of Reconveyance 
for one (1) PUD lot. (Emphasis added.) 
16. Paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided as follows: 
2. Upon the payment of the 
release price, Buyer shall be entitled 
to the release of one (1) lot of Buy-
er's choice upon receipt of the payment 
or at any time thereafter. (Emphasis 
added.) 
17. Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided as follows: 
3. It is agreed that, at the time 
of execution of this Memorandum, Buyer 
has paid to Seller the sum of 
$620,000.00 which will release from the 
Deed of Trust three (3) PUD lots. Upon 
the recordation of the PUD Plat and 
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions 
and Restrictions with the Summit County 
Recorder, Buyer shall be entitled to 
the release from the Deed of Trust of 
three (3) PUD lots of Buyer's choice 
together with the said roadway. (Em-
phasis added.) 
18. Paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided as follows: 
5. The proposed plat is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this ref-
erence incorporated herein. Seller 
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hereby acknowledges and agrees to exe-
cute as a lienholder the original plat 
prior to recordation. Changes in the 
proposed plat and the Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions 
when prepared shall be subject to the 
reasonable approval of Seller. (Em-
phasis added.) 
19. The proposed plat, Exhibit MA" attached to the Memo-
randum of Closing Terms included a boundary description de-
scribing all of the Subject Property and an Owner's Dedica-
tion. The Owner's Dedication is a standard printed form used 
by J.J. Johnson, parallels dedications used in the city limits 
of Park City and is commonly used in plats to dedicate roads 
to public use, not as a dedication for a private road as orig-
inally contemplated in the EIS. The Owner's Dedication pro-
vides in pertinent part as follows: 
Know all by these present that we the 
undersigned owners of the herein de-
scribed tract of land, having caused 
the same to be subdivided into lots 
and streets to hereafter be known as 
White Pine Ranches Subdivision, do 
hereby dedicate for perpetual use of 
the public all parcels of land shown 
on this plat as intended for public 
use, and do warrant, defend, and save 
the city harmless against any ease-
ments or other encumbrances on the 
dedicated streets which will interfere 
with the city's use, operation, and 
maintenance of the streets and do fur-
ther dedicate the easements as shown. 
(Emphasis added.) 
(Exhibit 20). 
20. Paragraph 6 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided in part as follows: 
6. Seller agrees to grant to Sum-
mit County the ten and one-half (10-
1/2) foot strip of land outlined in 
red on Exhibit "A". Said conveyance 
shall be for the sole purpose of 
widening the County roadway. If pos-
sible, such grant shall be in the form 
of an easement. The County indicates 
that it is possible that the County 
road as it exists is not where it is 
platted. 
21. The County roadway has not been widened, there are no 
current plans to do so, and Summit County has never requested 
such an easement from plaintiffs or the Sharps. (See Exhibit 
107, p. 15; Exhibit 87, p. 8; and Exhibit 34). 
22. Paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided in pertinent part as follows: 
7. Buyer agrees to provide Seller 
with one (1) sewer connection and one 
(1) culinary water connection into 3uv-
er' s svstems at such time as each is 
available, and Seller shall pay a con-
nection fee and service fee equal to 
the pro rata cost to the purchaser of a 
lot in Buyer's proposed PUD plus any 
charges of Summit Water Distributing 
Company. The sewer and water connec-
tion granted above can be used by Sell-
er in new construction if allowed on 
the 8.5 acre parcel or for connection 
to the existing residence of Seller.... 
(Emphasis added.) 
23. Subsequent to closing, attorney Jon Heaton represent-
ed Saunders in continuing plaintiffs1 attempts, begun prior to 
closing, to obtain County approval of a private road for the 
development. (Exhibit 127). 
24. Before signing the Closing Documents, on June 16, 
1981 and subsequently on November 1, 1983, Plaintiff White 
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Pine Ranches entered into sewer extension agreements with the 
SBSID to install a sewer trunk line up White Pine Canyon pur-
suant to which agreements White Pine Ranches would receive 
reimbursement for their construction costs of the sewer line 
to the development from connection fees charged to third par-
ties connecting to that line: 
Said third parties will be allowed to 
connect to such lines only upon payment 
to the District of the applicable num-
ber of connection fees. The District 
shall retain $100 plus the actual costs 
of construction and inspection from 
each such connection fee and pay the 
balance of each such connection fee to 
Applicant [White Pine Ranches]. 
(Exhibits 80 115(c) and 81 55C) . 
25. At the time plaintiffs were trying to obtain County 
approval of the development and agreeing to run the sewer line 
to Subject Property, it was anticipated that additional devel-
opments by third parties would occur in the White Pine Canyon 
vicinity, including the development of a ski resort in White 
Pine Canyon and the development of adjoining parcels of land, 
all of which future developments would hook into the sewer 
trunk line plaintiffs were to construct, allowing plaintiffs 
the opportunity to recoup expenditures for the sewer system 
through the connection fees paid pursuant to the provisions of 
the line extension agreements. (Exhibits 104, 105, 107 and 
117) . 
26. On June 30, 1982, White Pine Ranches paid the Sharps 
the installment payment of $308,177.69, by check (Exhibit 44) 
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enclosed with a cover letter from Felton stating: "Upon final 
plat approval, we will notify you to obtain the releases for 
the lots and the road as per the contract." (Exhibit 21). 
27. On June 28, 1983 and June 30, 1983, Felton and 
Saunders Land Investment Corporation paid to the Sharps the 
sum of $178,165.23 by two checks in the amount of $71,266.09 
and $106,899.14 respectively. (Exhibit 44). The remaining 
portion of the June 30, 1983 installment payment due from 
plaintiffs, a check from Dan Hunter in the amount of 
$106,849.14 was returned for insufficient funds, resulting in 
a default in the June 30, 19823 installment payment. (Exhibit 
22) . 
28. On or about July 19, 1983, while the June 30, 1983 
payment was in default and prior to the recordation of a final 
plat on the Subject Property, Felton wrote a letter to attor-
ney Jon Heaton, inquiring about obtaining a release from the 
Sharps of the road and five lots. The letter further ex-
plained that a final plat had not been recorded because "[a]s 
soon as we file the plat real estate taxes are going to go up 
significantly, which we would like to avoid until we have an 
actual buyer for one of the lots." (Exhibit 23). 
29. On or about September 23, 1983, a Notice of Default 
was filed pursuant to the Trust Deed on the Subject Property 
for the default in the June 30, 1983 payment. (Exhibit 24.) 
30. Plaintiffs made no claim during 1983 that the Sharps 
had breached the Closing Documents. 
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31. On or about November 14, 1983, the June 30, 1983 de-
fault under the Trust Deed was cured with a payment in the sum 
of $118,397.39 from Saunders Land Investment Corporation (Ex-
hibits 4 and 44). 
32. On or about November 18, 1983, attorney Jon Heaton 
sent a letter to the Sharps enclosing for their approval a 
proposed final plat, which was later recorded with Summit 
County (hereinafter the proposed "final plat"), and a Declara-
tion of Protective Covenants (hereinafter "CCRs"), which Dec-
laration was prepared on behalf of Saunders by Heaton and 
which contained covenants, conditions and restrictions for use 
of respecting a portion of the Subject Property by lot owners. 
(Exhibit 25). 
33. The proposed final plat enclosed with the November 18, 
1983 letter did not plat the entire approximately 60 acre par-
cel as originally contemplated in the Earnest Money and the 
Memorandum of Closing Terms, but platted only the northern 
portion of the Subject Property into six PUD lots, leaving the 
southern portion (approximately 27 acres) of the Subject Prop-
erty unplatted (hereinafter the "unplatted acreage"). (Exhib-
it 1) . 
34. The proposed final plat included an Ownerfs Dedica-
tion for a private road in the PUD and delineated the exist-
ence and location of the private road and certain utility 
easements, including easements for water lines, water tank and 
water systems. (Exhibit 1). 
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35. The November 18, 1983 letter from attorney Jon Heaton 
to the Sharps further provided in pertinent part that: 
At a later time in the near future, Hy 
[Saunders] has indicated he will seek 
release of Lots 1 through 5 of the 
platted subdivision along with his road 
(White Pine Lane).... We will handle 
that matter when it is presented.... 
When those releases are made, pursuant 
to your instruction we will insure that 
rights are reserved in White Pine Lane 
for access for the southern portions of 
the property purchased from you until 
your Deed of Trust is fully paid. (Em-
phasis added.) 
(Exhibit 25 and 25a). 
36. On or about November 21, 1983, Felton mailed a letter 
to Jon Heaton regarding the November 18, 1983 letter to John 
Sharp. The letter provided in pertinent part: "It is per-
fectly acceptable to us that he [Mr. Sharp] retain an easement 
over White Pine Lane to the southern part of his property as 
well as to Lot 6 from White Pine Canyon Road up to the western 
boundary of Lot 6." (Exhibit 26). 
37. On or about November 28, 1983, Felton had a telephone 
conversation with attorney Heaton memorialized by notes of 
attorney Heaton in the margin of Felton's November 21, 1983 
letter (Exhibit 26) . Felton agreed that "access over road 
[White Pine Lane] retained if Sharp develops undeveloped prop-
erty Lots 7-12 White Pine Ranch." (Exhibit 26a). 
38. On or about November 23, 1983, the Sharps authorized 
the recording of a Cancellation of Notice of Default relating 
to the June 30, 1983 payment (Exhibit 27). 
-13-
39. On or about November 23, 1983, the Sharps, in consi-
deration of the agreement of plaintiffs to allow them access 
over the private roadway (White Pine Lane) in the event of 
foreclosure, and pursuant to their right of approval under 
paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms, also executed 
a Consent to Record Phase I of White Pine Ranches, which Con-
sent after setting forth the metes and bounds description of 
Phase I of White Pine Ranches granted: 
[A] non-exclusive easement for water 
lines, water tank and water systems 
over, under and across the property, 
shown here near the southwest corner of 
the subject property, and specifically 
described in the Declaration of Pro-
tective Covenants and reserving unto 
the owners, for granting to the owners 
of adjacent or nearby property, a^  
non-exclusive easement for utilities 
and vehicular and pedestrian access 
over the private roadway shown on the 
plat and from the well sites as de-
veloped. (Emphasis added.) 
(Exhibit 51) . As additional consideration for signing the 
Consent to Record, the Sharps permitted the platting of only a 
portion of the Subject Property. 
40. The proposed final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I 
sent to the Sharps for approval on November 18, L983 was re-
corded on December 23, 1983 in the office of the Summit County 
Recorder following the execution of the Consent to Record by 
the Sharps. (Exhibit 1). The CCRs were also recorded in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder on December 23, 1983 and 
the Consent to Record was attached as an exhibit thereto. 
(Exhibit 51) . 
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41. After recordation of the final plat, .the CCRs and the 
Consent to Record, plaintiffs proceeded with construction of 
the improvements on the Subject Property. However, instead of 
adopting any of the alternatives described in Finding No. 6, 
supra, plaintiffs constructed a small, private water system 
for this development. 
42. On or about January 18, 1984, the Sharps executed a 
direction to the Trustee under the Deed of Trust to release 
from the Deed of Trust Lots 1 through 5 of White Pine Ranches 
(Exhibit 28). 
43. The Partial Reconveyance of Lots 1 through 5 directed 
and authorized by the Sharps, was not prepared by Associated 
Title, the trustee under the Trust Deed, until January 7, 1986 
and was recorded March 26, 1986 (Exhibit 45). No explanation 
of the delay in preparing the Partial Reconveyance was provid-
ed at trial. Plaintiffs, although naming Associated Title as 
a defendant in this action, chose not to serve or pursue and 
question Associated Title for such delay. No other request 
for reconveyance was authorized by the Sharps. 
44. On or about January 20, 1984, Felton sent a letter to 
attorney Heaton expressing astonishment that the deeds to Lots 
1 through 5 had not been received but stating, "I realize that 
the deeds for the road may be difficult to do." (Exhibit 30). 
45. On or about January 17, 1984, Felton sent a letter to 
attorney Heaton requesting the approval by the Sharps of a 
"multi-family development" on the unplatted acreage, "which is 
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the only way it [the development] will be economically feasi-
ble." (Exhibit 29). A multi-family concept was never adopt-
ed. 
46. Felton testified at trial and affirmed on May 7, 1986 
in a letter sent to the Sharps that the plaintiffs "were in a 
position to prepare and obtain approval of that plat [for the 
unplatted acreage] immediately." (Trial Transcript, p. 110, 
hereinafter "R." 110 and Exhibit 37). 
47. It was the actual practice of plaintiffs and a re-
quirement of paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms to 
make specific requests for the release of specific PUD lots 
from the Sharps after required payments were made and provided 
no defaults existed under the Closing Documents. (R. 334). 
48. Property taxes on the unreleased property (Lot 6 and 
the unplatted acreage) became delinquent pursuant to law on 
November 30, 1984 when plaintiffs failed to pay all of the 
1984 property taxes due on- the Subject Property (Stipulation 
of counsel at Trial) in violation of paragraphs 5 and 14 of 
the Trust Deed, which provided in paragraph 5 that the Trustor 
[plaintiffs] agrees "to pay at least 10 days before delinquen-
cy all taxes and assessments affecting said property...." 
(Exhibit 2). 
49. Except for $1,515.24 in property taxes paid on the 
unplatted acreage in 1984, no taxes have been paid on the 
unreleased Subject Property (Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage) 
subsequent to November 30, 1984, and including 1985, 1986 and 
1987 (Stipulation of counsel at Trial), and plaintiffs, there-
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fore, remained in default under the provisions of paragraphs 5 
and 14 of the Trust Deed, 
50• Plaintiffs paid the 1984 installment payment. However, 
on or about June 27, 1985, the Sharps received only a portion 
of the June 30, 1985 installment payment in the form of a 
check from Felton in the amount of $59,709-47 (Exhibit 44). 
51. As a result of plaintiffs' defaults, a Notice of 
Default was recorded on September 16, 1985 covering the Sub-
ject Property as described in the Trust Deed, which descrip-
tion included Lots 1-5. (Exhibit 55). 
52. On or about September 24, 1985, Felton sent a 
letter to Mr. Sharp acknowledging receipt of the September 
1985 Notice of Default and assuring him "every attempt is be-
ing made to resolve the problem...." (Exhibit 31). Felton, 
in his letter made no allegation that the Sharps had slandered 
plaintiffs' title as a result of the inclusion of Lots 1-5 in 
the Notice of Default nor did Felton or any other plaintiff 
allege in 1984 or 1985 any breach of Closing Documents by the 
Sharps. 
53. Significantly, as bearing upon the credibility of 
plaintiffs' arguments is the fact unrebutted that plaintiffs 
made no claims whatsoever of breach by the Sharps until after 
their own admitted breaches of the Closing Documents. (Ex-
hibit 31) . 
54. On or about January 10, 1986, Felton wrote a letter 
to Blake G. Heiner of Associated Title Company, the Trustee 
under the Trust Deed, informing him that the Notice of Default 
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(Exhibit 55) and Amended Notice of Sale (Exhibit 56) covering 
the Subject Property included Lots 1 through 5 which were to 
have been released, pursuant to the Sharps' direction. (Ex-
hibit 57) . 
55. In response to Felton's letter (Exhibit 57), Blake 
Heiner for Associated Title Company prepared and recorded an 
Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale against the Subject Property, 
excluding Lots 1 through 5. (Exhibit 58). Other Notices 
filed subsequently against the Subject Property also excluded 
Lots 1 through 5. (Exhibits 3 and 36). 
56. All of the Notices of Default and Notices of 
Trustee's Sale recorded against the Subject Property specif-
ically provided that such Notices are: 
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments, 
Restrictions, Rights-of-Way and matters 
of record enforceable in law (sic) 
equity. 
(Exhibits 5, 36, 55, 56, and 58). 
57. No payment at all was made when the final install-
ment under the Closing Documents was due on June 30, 1986. 
58. The balance owing to the Sharps under the Trust Deed 
Note through March 22, J.988 is $557,642.46, including 
$371,739.35 principal; $23,113.33 interest at 12%; $147,920.21 
default interest at 18%; and $14,869.52 late payment charges 
of 4% on each overdue payment. Interest is accruing at a per 
diem rate of $183.32. (Exhibit 122). 
59. Plaintiffs made no written or oral request for the 
release of the roadway or Lot 6 prior to their default in 
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November 1984, when the 1984 property taxes became delinquent, 
and prior to their default in failing to make the entire 1985 
installment payment when due. Plaintiffs' first requests were 
made for such releases on February 27, 1986 and May 7, 1986, 
respectively. (Exhibits 35 and 37). Also for the first time 
in the letter dated February 27, 1986, plaintiffs requested a 
release from the Sharps for 7.5 acres of the unplatted acre-
age, despite the provision in paragraphs 1-3 of the Memorandum 
of Closing Terms for the release by the Sharps of "PUD lots" 
only. As of these dates, plaintiffs were still and are in of 
default for the 1984 and 1985 property taxes and the payment a 
portion of the 1985 payment and the full 1986 payment required 
under the Addendum to the Trust Deed Note. 
60. The Sharps perceived that the execution by them of 
the Consent to Record constituted substantial performance of 
any obligation to release the roadway pursuant to paragraphs 3 
and 6 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms. 
61. As plaintiff Felton testified, "the contract [Memo-
randum of Closing Terms] says lots of buyer's choice and that 
would require a choice." After the release of Lots 1-5, 
plaintiffs may have chosen to prepare a plat of the then un-
platted acreage and seek a release of a portion of it instead 
of Lot 6. 
62. Also in the letter of February 27, 1986, Felton de-
manded from the Sharps for the first time approximately 
$73,000.00 as their "cost of the sewer and water hook-ups 
which are now available." (Exhibit 35). No demand for such 
-19-
costs had been made of the Sharps prior to that time nor had 
plaintiffs provided an accounting of such costs. Before 
trial, plaintiffs claimed exorbitant expenses of $1,638,753.61 
for the complete costs for the construction of the improve-
ments on and to the Subject Property (Exhibit 32a). 
63. At trial, plaintiffs claimed costs for the construc-
tion of improvements on and to the Subject Property of 
$1,063,348.10, (Exhibit 60) and plaintiffs modified their de-
mand from the Sharps for water and sewer connection fees to 
$43,706.00. (Exhibit 66). 
64. Prior to actual construction of the sewer system, 
Saunders told the Summit County Planning Commission in a 
meeting on December 14, 1982 that they "would really like to 
have the septic tank system used because of the high cost of 
the sewer line but in the long run it may be the best way to 
go." (Exhibit 79). On or about September 16, 1983, Felton 
wrote Summit County challenging the requirement "to install a 
sewer line up the County road from Highway U-224 to the 
Project, a distance of about one and one-half (1-1/2) miles." 
(Exhibit 79). Felton concluded the letter by declaring: "In 
the event we are required to install the sewer line, we will 
test the validity of that requirement in court." 
65. Plaintiffs made formal demand upon Summit County on 
or about July 26, 1984 for, inter alia, the following damages: 
The sum of $117,297.15 being the 
costs of off-site sewer which we 
were, under protest, required to 
install to service the subdivision. 
* ** 
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[W]e [plaintiffs] have lost one sale or 
more sales and anticipate the damages, 
loss of profit and interest at between 
$250,000 and $500,000. 
*** 
[D]amages for the loss of sale, reduction 
in business and damages suffered in reduc-
tion to profit .... 
(Exhibit 84). 
66. Soon thereafter plaintiffs brought suit in the United 
States District Court, District of Utah, Civil No. C84-2090W, 
against Summit County, the SBSID and various officials thereof 
to recover their claimed damages. 
67. In answer to interrogatories dated December 28, 1984 
in the Federal Court litigation, plaintiffs stated: 
Because of the imposition of the re-
quirement that Plaintiffs construct an 
off-site sewer approximately one mile in 
length, the costs of developing the 
entire project became prohibitive. 
(Exhibit 116; see also, Exhibit 107, p. 7). 
68. In further interrogatory answers on March 31, 1986, 
Saunders declared: 
At the present time I have recently found 
out that the right-of-way servicing my 
property has been forfeited by Summit 
County contrary to law. This will not 
allow my development to proceed, will not 
allow me to recover costs for the capital 
improvement and significantly diminishes 
the value of the property. 
(Exhibit 107, p. 15). 
69. In Saunders' Federal Court affidavit dated March 17, 
1986, he also swore: 
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10. As a result of the various 
delays [caused by the County and the 
SBSID], which are detailed below, the 
market for exclusive building lots is now 
virtually non-existent, cost of improve-
ments escalated to be several times what 
I had anticipated, and much of the real 
property in the project is threatened by 
foreclosure. 
(Exhibit 86, p. 3). 
70. Most of the damages sought to be recovered by the 
plaintiffs in the lawsuit against the SBSID and Summit County 
are the same damages plaintiffs sought to recover from the 
Sharps in the present case. (R. 252 and 263; cf. Exhibits 60 
with 86; see also Exhibits 87, 88, 107, 116 and Plaintiffs1 
Verified Complaint herein). 
71. No written or oral claim of default on the part of 
the Sharps under the Closing Documents was made by the plain-
tiffs until February 27, 1986, subsequent to plaintiffs1 own 
defaults in failing to pay the 1984 and 1985 property taxes 
and failing to pay the full 1985 payment required under the 
Addendum to the Trust Deed Note. 
72. The Sharps did not interfere with plaintiffs' 
attempts to market or sell the Subject Property. 
73. Plaintiffs received only one invitation for an offer 
to purchase Lot 1 or Lot 6, which invitation was not consum-
mated due to the failure of conditions imposed by the one, 
B. F. Sammons, and the failure of such conditions were unre-
lated to any actions or statements of the Sharps. (Exhibit 
88) . 
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74. One of the conditions of purchase by Sammons was an 
independent appraisal supporting a $220,000 proposed sales 
price (Exhibit 88). The plaintiffs provided Sammons with a 
letter appraisal, dated August 8, 1986, which had been pre-
pared by LeRoy Pia. (Exhibit 9a). This appraisal stated that 
Lots 1 and 6 had a fair market value of $220,000. On or 
about November 11, 1986, while Sammons and Saunders were still 
negotiating, a letter appraisal was obtained by Steve Clyde, 
attorney for the plaintiffs from the same appraiser, valuing 
the lots at an average of only $190,000.00 (Exhibit 9). The 
November 11, 1986 appraisal was not shown to Sammons. (R. 
283-4). 
75. Saunders had given Sammons "the impression" that 
plaintiffs could convey Lot 6 to him even though it had not 
been released from the Trust Deed. (R. 389; see also R. 284). 
76. On or about March 24, 1987, Felton, pursuant to the 
request of the real estate agent, Steve Clegg, employed by 
plaintiffs to list Lots 1, 2 and 5, wrote a letter to Clegg 
for dissemination to other Park City real estate agents, which 
letter stated "[t]he current litigation does not affect the 
marketability or encumber that [Subject] property." (Exhibit 
89.) 
77. After the commencement of this action, the Sharps 
took all reasonable steps to facilitate the sale and marketing 
of the Subject Property as evidenced by a letter dated Septem-
ber 30, 1986, to plaintiffs' prior attorney, Steven Clyde, who 
was notified by Donald J. Winder, the Sharps' attorney, that 
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the Sharps would take all steps reasonable to effect a sale of 
Lot 6 or the unplatted acreage (Exhibit 33), and the Sharps1 
Motion to Appoint a Receiver for the Subject Property in this 
proceeding dated May 14, 1987. 
78. There have been no arms length sales to purchasers of 
PUD lots at the Subject Property wherein sewer and water con-
nection and service fees have been assessed. The only convey-
ance of a PUD lot has been to Felton, a member of bhe partner-
ships. At trial, plaintiffs testified that they intended, at 
all times, to include the cost of the sewer and water connec-
tion and service fees within the sales price of lots. (R. 
310-312)• 
79. Mr. Sammons was not to be charged any sum above and 
beyond a $220,000 land price for sewer or water connection 
fees. (R. 285). 
80. Felton testified that a purchaser of one of the PUD 
lots listed with real estate agent Clegg would only be charged 
"over and above ... the purchase price" "the hook-up fee to be 
charged by Snyderville Basin for sewer." (R. 310). 
81. If plaintiffs sold a lot to Sammons at $220,000, they 
would not have been "compensated for those [sewer and water] 
improvement costs...." At a $220,000 sales price it's "impos-
sible" to recover the costs of sewer and water improvements to 
the Subject Property. "You have to take a loss," (R. 311-
312). 
82. The sewer system, as of the date of trial, is not 
completed or operational, nor has its construction been 
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approved by the SBSID. (Exhibits 83, 83a and 99 through 103). 
The culinary water system as of the date of trial is also not 
operational. Under paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Closing 
Terms, the Sharps do not have to pay connection fees for these 
systems until they are "available." (Exhibit 15). 
83. The sewer system constructed by plaintiffs has a 
capacity to handle between 2,000 and 3,800 connections. (Ex-
hibit 86) . 
84. Under the line extension agreements with the SBSID, a 
connection fee "at the rate in effect at the time of connec-
tion" shall be determined by the SBSID for the system on the 
Subject Property (Exhibit 81, paragraph 4D; see Exhib-
it 80, paragraph 4(d)). The "connection fee shall be paid by 
the property owner" before issuance of a building permit, to 
the Application (the plaintiffs herein), except that the 
SBSID, shall be entitled to "the first $100 of the connection 
fee." 
85. The parties intended the language in the Earnest 
Money concerning "same per-hook-up price" to be synonymous 
with the language contained in paragraph 7, Memorandum of 
Closing Terms, regarding "pro rata cost" to a PUD lot purchas-
er. 
86. Average and reasonable connection fees for culinary 
water and sewer systems in the Park City and Snyderville Basin 
area are $2,000.00 each. (See Testimony of John C. Brown and 
Rex Ausburn, cf. Exhibit 86, p. 6). 
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87. The Sharps intended and wanted to be charged only 
what purchasers of a PUD lot would be charged as fees to con-
nect to the culinary water and sewer systems on the Subject 
Property, and the plaintiffs should have understood that this 
was the intent of paragraph 7, Memorandum of Closing Terms. 
88. The Sharps repeatedly assured plaintiffs that they 
did not intend, through their foreclosure, to interfere with 
access rights over the private roadway or to the utility ease-
ments shown on the Consent to Record which the Sharps signed. 
(R. 64; Exhibits 33 and 51; cf. Exhibits 25, 25a, 26 and 26a). 
89. Correspondingly, it was both the mutual intent and 
agreement of the parties that the Sharps be granted use of the 
roadway in event of default (Exhibits 25, 25a, 26 and 26a), 
which agreement was later memorialized and recorded in the 
Consent to Record. (Exhibit 51). 
90. The inclusion of Lots 1 through 5 in the September 
1985 Notice of Default (Exhibit 55) and December 1985 Amended 
Notice of Trustee's Sale (Exhibit 56) was inadvertent, un-
intentional and without malice. 
91. In refusing to reconvey Lot 6, the road, the unplat-
ted acreage, the Sharps acteci in good faith and relied on the 
advice of attorney Jon Heaton. 
92. The Sharps have been charged trustees1 fees by 
Associated Title in their efforts to foreclose the Subject 
Property in the amount of $1,803.80 (Exhibit 42). 
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93- Plaintiffs have not suffered any damages, special or 
otherwise, as a result of any act or failure to act by the 
Sharps. 
94. Paragraph 13 of the Trust Deed provides that failure 
to promptly enforce any right thereunder does "not constitute 
a waiver of any other right or subsequent default." (Exhibit 
2) . 
95. On September 4, 1986, the day before the scheduled 
Trustee's Sale, plaintiffs filed a Complaint commencing this 
action and obtained the issuance of a Temporary Restraining 
Order (TRO) from Judge Judith M. Billings to restrain the 
Sharps from conducting the Trustee's Sale of the Subject Prop-
erty. The TRO required a bond in the amount of $2,400. In a 
hearing held on January 4, 1988, this Court required that the 
bond be increased to $50,000 "to protect the Sharps for the 
payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suf-
fered if the Sharps are found to have been wrongfully enjoined 
or restrained...." 
96. The Trust Deed Note provided that if it "is collected 
by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or 
interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned ... 
agree to pay ... a reasonable attorney's fee." (Exhibit 3)., 
Paragraph 16 of the Trust Deed provided: "Upon the 
occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary [the Sharps] 
shall have the option to ... foreclose the Trust Deed ... and 
Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover ... a reasonable 
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attorney's fee...." (Exhibit 2; see also All thereof). Fur-
ther, paragraph 6 of the Trust Deed provided that Beneficiary 
(the Sharps) may "commence, appear in and defend any action or 
proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the 
rights of [sic] powers of Beneficiary . . . and in exercising 
any such powers ... employ counsel, and pay his reasonable 
fees." Additionally, paragraph 7 of the Trust Deed requires 
Trustor to "pay immediately and without demand all sums ex-
pended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with interest from 
date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per 
annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured 
hereby." Paragraph 11 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided that "the defaulting party shall pay all expenses of 
enforcing the same or any right arising out of breach or de-
fault thereof, including reasonable attorneys' fees, whether 
incurred with or without suit and both before and after judg-
ment." (Exhibit 15). 
97. Legal services have been rendered to the Sharps by 
the law firm of Winder & Haslam in the nature of time expended 
by individual members, through August 31, 1988, in the amount 
of $144,469.75. 
98. The foregoing amount does not include any services 
performed on or after August 31, 1988, including those servic-
es of Winder & Haslam necessary for finalizing the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and preparing for, re-
sponding to and arguing any post trial motions. The legal 
fees for such matters may be supplemented later. 
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99. The services rendered by the law firm of Winder & 
Haslam, excluding legal research related to attorney's mal-
practice, were reasonably necessary for the development of the 
case and protection of the rights of the Sharps; and the rates 
charged are reasonable and are in accordance with those rates 
generally charged by attorneys in this area for similar ser-
vices. 
100. Plaintiffs breached the Memorandum of Closing Terms 
by, inter alia, failing to make the payments intended thereby 
to the Sharps and by failing to make available sewer and water 
connections at the same charge to purchasers of a PUD lot. 
101. Pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Memorandum of Closing 
Terms, all "agreements contained [t]herein shall survive the 
closing of this transaction...." (Exhibit 15). 
102. The Sharps* defense of plaintiffs1 Complaint was an 
action purporting to affect the security under the Trust Deed 
and the rights and powers of the Sharps; related to collecting 
the Promissory Note after default; related to foreclosing the 
Trust Deed; and related to enforcing the Memorandum of Closing 
Terms and rights arising out of a breach or default thereof. 
103. After closing the Sale on the Subject Property, on or 
about July 16, 1981, attorney Heaton represented White Pine 
Ranches relating to the development of the Subject Property 
(R. 789) until the filing by Associated Title of a Notice of 
Default on or about September 16, 1985. (R. 836; Exhibit 55). 
Attorney Heaton did not represent the Sharps between the clos-
ing of the sale and the filing of the first Notice of Default 
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on or about September 23, 1983. (R. 791; Exhibit 24). For a 
period of time after the filing of the first Notice of Default 
on or about September 23, 1983, and after the filing of the 
Notice of Default on September 16, 1985 (R. 793), attorney 
Heaton did represent the Sharps. 
104. The Sharps have incurred costs of court in this ac-
tion. 
Having made the above Findings of Fact, the Court here-
with makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Closing Documents, which term is defined in 
Finding No. 10 above, are the operative documents relating to 
the parties' closing of the sale of the Subject Property by 
the Sharps to the plaintiffs, and this transaction constitutes 
the Contract between the parties (hereinafter the "Contract"). 
2. Plaintiffs, by their failure to pay the 1984, 1985, 
1986 and 1987 property taxes on Lot 6 and the unplatted acre-
age on November 30 of each respective year, are thereby in 
breach of the Trust Deed. 
3. Plaintiffs' failure to pay the entire June 30, 1985 
installment payment and the 30, 1986 final installment payment 
required pursuant to paragraph ID and IE of the Addendum to 
the Trust Deed Note constitutes a breach of the Trust Deed 
Note, Trust Deed and Memorandum of Closing Terms. 
4. Plaintiffs' breaches were material, significant and 
continuing and were uncured when plaintiffs releases were 
first requested by plaintiffs for the roadway and Lot 6 on 
February 27, 1986 and again on May 7, 1986. 
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5. The breaches by plaintiffs of the Contract occurred 
prior in time to any alleged breaches by the Sharps, and this 
Court specifically holds there were no material or significant 
breaches on the part of the Sharps of their obligations under 
the parties1 Contract. 
6. The Sharps have substantially complied with all of 
their obligations under the terms of the parties' Contract. 
7. Plaintiffs were obligated, under the terms of the 
Memorandum of Closing Terms and pursuant to their own prac-
tice, to specifically request and identify lots, including Lot 
6, for release by the Sharps. 
8. Because the plaintiffs' material and continuing 
breaches of the parties' Contract preceded timely plaintiffs' 
requests for reconveyance of Lot 6, the roadway and the un-
platted acreage, defendants were not obligated to reconvey Lot 
6, the roadway and the unplatted acreage. 
9. The Sharps were justified in and were excused from 
performance under the Contract to reconvey Lot 6, the roadway 
or the unplatted acreage shown on the final plat of to the 
plaintiffs because the plaintiffs were in breach of the par-
ties' Contract at the time such reconveyances were requested. 
10. Alternatively, the Sharps' execution of the Consent 
to Record the final plat of and the CCRs constituted a release 
of the roadway shown on such plat in accordance with para-
graphs 3 and 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms. 
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11. The execution of the Consent to Record by the Sharps 
and the subsequent recordation of the final plat and the CCRs 
created a non-exclusive appurtenant easements to run with the 
land, as a covenant running with the land or as an equitable 
servitude, as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and 
benefit of the unplatted acreage and the owners and purchasers 
thereof (including the Sharps), and their invitees, guests, 
heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and for access 
to and the right to use as a means for ingress and egress for 
vehicular and pedestrian access over, under and across the 
private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the recorded final 
plat, and a non-exclusive appurtenant easement to run with the 
land, as a covenant running with the land or as an equitable 
servitude, as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and 
benefit of White Pine Ranches Phase I and the owners and pur-
chasers thereof (including the Sharps) and their heirs and 
successors in interest for water lines, water tank and water 
systems over, under and across the Subject Property near the 
southwest corner of the unplatted acreage as shown on the 
final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I. 
12. The Sharps are estopped to deny the dedication of 
White Pine Lane, pursuant to the final recorded plat, for the 
private use of the parcel owners, their invitees and guests, 
subject to the CCRs and the non-exclusive appurtenant easement 
for the use and benefit of the unplatted acreage described in 
Conclusion No. 11 above. Further, the Sharps are estopped to 
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deny the non-exclusive utility easement also described in Con-
clusion No. 11 above. 
13. The Sharps, by the execution of the Consent to Re-
cord, are estopped to deny the operative and legal effect of 
the recordation of the final plat and CCRs and the rights and 
obligations of the owners of PUD lots as set forth in the re-
corded final plat and CCRs for White Pine Ranches Phase I. 
The final recorded plat and CCRs and the non-exclusive ease-
ments set forth in Conclusion No. 11 above shall remain in 
full force and effect, and not be affected by the foreclosure 
ordered herein, a purchase at the Sheriff's Sale, or a subse-
quent redemption of the subject premises, other than a com-
plete redemption thereof by the plaintiffs herein coupled with 
plaintiffs1 declaration for the extinguishment of the non-
exclusive easement in favor of the unplatted acreage. 
14. Owners and purchasers of the unplatted acreage (in-
cluding the Sharps), and their successors in interest are en-
titled to use of the private roadway (White Pine Lane) for 
access to the unplatted acreage of the Subject Property as set 
forth in the legal description attached hereto as Exhibit "A" 
and incorporated by reference herein, as a result of the 
mutual intent and agreements between the parties to grant to 
the Sharps the use of the roadway, which agreement was memori-
alized by the letters of Heaton and Felton and evidenced by 
the part performance and reliance of the Sharps on such let-
ters and agreements in executing the Consent to Record. 
15. General partners m a partnership are bound by the 
actions of other partners taken on behalf of the partnership 
and by the actions of the partnership itself. 
16. The language in paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of 
Closing Terms "pro rata cost to the purchaser" is ambiguous, 
necessitating the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret the 
same. 
17. The extrinsic evidence presented at trial demon-
strated that the parties intended to allow the Sharps, at 
their request, one connection each to both the culinary water 
and sewer systems when and if such systems are available and 
operational. 
18. The construction costs of the culinary water and 
sewer systems claimed by the plaintiffs are not reasonable, in 
violation of the reasonable value rule. 
19. Seven years is an unreasonable time within which to 
complete the culinary water and sewer systems and require the 
Sharps to mandatorily hook into these systems, which systems 
still are not yet operational. The Sharps are not obligated, 
but have the option, to hook into the culinary water and sewer 
systems should such systems become operational. 
20. It is an unreasonable interpretation of the language 
"pro rata costs" in the Memorandum of Closing Terms and the 
earlier language in the Earnest Money delineating "the same 
per-hook-up price" to require the Sharps to pay 1/13 of the 
exorbitant construction costs for culinary water and sewer 
hook-ups. Such an interpretation would recast the Sharps as 
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developers rather than the mere sellers of Subject Property 
that they were and intended to be in this transaction. 
21. A reasonable fee to be paid by the Sharps to the 
plaintiffs for a connection to the culinary water and sewer 
systems is $2,000.00 each. 
22. The inclusion of Lots 1-5 in the initial Notice of 
Default (Exhibit 55) and Notice of Trustee's Sale (Exhibit 
56) on behalf of the Sharps was inadvertent, unintentional and 
without malice. 
23. There was no improper holding by the Sharps of any 
requested reconveyance, but even if there were, it was not 
done in bad faith. The Sharps acted in reliance on the advice 
of their counsel, and did so in good faith. 
24. Alternatively, the Sharps did not improperly withhold 
reconveyances and plaintiffs have failed to establish a cause 
of action for failure to reconvey under U.C.A. §57-1-33. 
U.C.A. §57-1-33 is applicable only when a beneficiary refuses 
to request a reconveyance within 30 days after written demand 
therefor is made by the Trustor. The Sharps requested the 
Trustee to reconvey Lots 1-5 on or about January 18, 1984, and 
because of plaintiffs' subsequent breaches were under no obli-
gation to reconvey the remainder of the Subject Property. 
25. As a result of plaintiffs1 breaches of the Contract, 
the Sharps were entitled to record all of the Notices of De-
fault and Notices of Sale described in the Findings against 
the Subject Property. 
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26. The Sharps acted in good faith and not maliciously in 
having recorded the Notices of Default and the Notices of Sale 
and in refusing to reconvey Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage. 
27. The plaintiffs have not established a cause of action 
for slander of title against the Sharps. The Sharps did not 
act maliciously or cause any special damages to the plain-
tiffs. 
28. All of the damages, including, without limitation, 
those under U.C.A. §57-1-33, claimed by the plaintiffs are too 
remote, conjectural and speculative. The plaintiffs have 
failed to establish they have suffered actual damages result-
ing from any alleged breach by the Sharps, and this Court con-
cludes no such breach by the Sharps occurred. 
29. The attorney's fees incurred by the Sharps in this 
matter through August 31, 1988 in the amount of $144,469.75 
are reasonable and the Sharps are entitled to an award of the 
same. Further, the Sharps are entitled to supplement and aug-
ment this amount by affidavit for their reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of the 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any post-
trial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution or 
otherwise, and, if necessary, after prevailing on any appeal. 
30. The Sharps are entitled to their costs of court in 
the amount as assessed or taxed pursuant to U.R.C.P. 54 and to 
post-judgment interest as provided by law. 
31. By virtue of the significant and material breaches of 
the Contract by the plaintiffs, the Sharps are entitled to 
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s 
$ 
$ 
1,803.80 
2 ,881 .04 
144 ,088 .75 
judgment against Saunders, Felton, Interstate Rentals, Inc. 
and Norton, jointly and severally, in the following amounts: 
a. i. Principal: $ 371,739.35 
ii. Interest through 
March 22, 1988: $ 171,033.54 
iii. Late payment charge: $ 14,869.57 
TOTAL: $ 557,642.46 
together with interest thereon at the per diem rate of 
$183.32 from and after March 22, 1988. 
b. i. Trustee!s fees: 
ii. Court Costs: 
iii. Attorneys' fees through 
August 31, 1988: 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per 
annum from the date of expenditure by the Sharps until 
paid by plaintiffs. 
c. Delinquent property taxes: $ 20,368.62 
together with interest and penalties assessed thereon as 
provided by law, property taxes accruing for 1988, and 
post-judgment interest thereon at the rate of 12% per 
annum. 
32. As a result of the significant and material breaches 
of the Contract by the plaintiffs, the Temporary Restraining 
Order entered in the above captioned matter by the Honorable 
Judith M. Billings on September 4, 1986 was wrongfully issued 
and the Sharps are entitled to have it lifted and dissolved. 
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33. The Sharps are entitled to be paid the bond posted by 
plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in September, 1986 in 
the amount of $2,400 and to be paid from the security posted 
by Tracy Collins Bank in the amount of $28,570.63 for their 
interest, attorney's fees and other damages incurred as a re-
sult of the issuance of the wrongful Temporary Restraining 
Order, and for which amounts the Sharps are not secured by the 
fair market value of the Subject Property. 
34. The Sharps are entitled to have Lot 6 as described in 
the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I and the 
unplatted property more particularly described on Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto or such portions thereof as may be sufficient 
to pay the amounts found to be due and owing under the Judg-
ment, together with interest as set forth hereinabove and 
accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, sold at public 
auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State of Utah, in the 
manner prescribed by law for such sales; that said Sheriff, if 
and when the subject premises are sold by him, out of the pro-
ceeds of such sale shall retain first his costs, disbursements 
and commission, and then pay to the Sharps, or to their attor-
neys, the accrued and accruing costs of this action, then said 
sums for the Sharps' attorney's fees, and the amount owing to 
the Sharps for principal, interest, costs and expenses of sale 
and maintenance, taxes, assessments and/or insurance premiums, 
together with accrued interest thereon, or so much of said 
sums as said proceeds will pay, and that the surplus, if any, 
shall be accounted for and paid over to the Clerk of this 
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Court subject to this Court's further order. 
35. All persons having an interest in the subject premis-
es shall have the right, upon producing satisfactory proof of 
interest, to redeem the same within the time provided by law 
for such redemption; that from and after the expiration of the 
period of redemption as provided by law, that the plaintiffs 
above named, and each of them, and all persons claiming by, 
through or under them, or any of them, shall be forever barred 
and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and estate in and 
to the subject premises, and that from and after the delivery 
of the Sheriff's Deed to the subject premises that the 
grantees named therein be given possession thereof. 
36. If a deficiency results after due and proper applica-
tion of the proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are 
entitled to be awarded a personal judgment against Saunders, 
Felton, Norton and Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them, 
jointly and severally, for the full amount of such deficiency. 
37. The Sharps are entitled to have the right, at their 
request, to one connection to both plaintiffs' culinary water 
and sewer systems on White Pine Ranches Phase I for a connec-
tion fee of $2,000 each. 
38. The Sharps are entitled to have the Complaint of the 
plaintiffs dismissed, no cause of action. 
DATED this ffiytfay of f^c£ , 1988. 
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Donald J. Winder, Esq. (#3519) 
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq. (#4022) 
Tamara K. Prince, Esq. (#5224) 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants Sharps 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT 
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; WHITE PINE RANCHES, a 
Utah general partnerhip; 
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a 
Utah general partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE 
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
JOHN C SHARP, and GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP, 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT FELTON, LEON H. 
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; KENNETH R. NORTON dba 
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INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC., 
and PAUL H. LANDES, indivi-
dually; WHITE PINE RANCHES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
This cause came on for trial before the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick on January 28, 1988 through January 29, 
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the de-
fendants John C. and Geraldine Y. Sharp (hereinafter the 
"Sharps") appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A, F. 
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac 
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enter-
prises, Leon H. Saunders (hereinafter "Saunders"), Robert 
Felton (hereinafter "Felton"), J. Richard Rees and Saunders 
Land Investment Corporation appearing by counsel. Robert M. 
Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord. Counterclaim 
defendant Kenneth R. Norton ("Norton") appeared through his 
counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and 
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim 
defendant Norton. Defendant Associated Title was never served 
in this action. Counterclaim defendant Paul H. Landes (here-
inafter "Landes") was never served in this action. 
Having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, 
0041 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED that plaintiffs1 complaint be dismissed, no cause of 
action. 
i: r IS FURTHER • I I D E R E D , ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
- > i: s I: e J t o n 11 11 e r s t a t e R e n t. a 1! =s 1 n < ::, a n d N o r ti • :D n a : < 2 :i 1 1 -
;ectadf jointly and several ly, \ le Sharps i n the follow! ng 
amounts 1 
a, i I- "i: :i  1 ici pa] :* ' . J 3 
i :li Interest t^-ouch 
March 22 '!!• f 1 7.1 0 3 3,54 
iii . I .at s pa^ 1 rie - : J 1 4 3 6 9 5 7 
TOTAL: I 557,64 2 .46 
together wj th i nterest rherec • •**- p ^ diem rate of 
$183 32 f; 1 • :: 1 1: • = .1 .• :! ft- ; : 
Trustee's fees: $ 1,803.80 
[lourt' Costs: $ 2,881.04 
i _ a ttorneys' fees through 
August 3 J , 1988 : .1 44 , 088 . 75 
t j ' i 1»f K'•*"" AI M ' **r P :* t f h P r *^ « ^ j * • ' 1 i" 1 ' (| ' ° 
annum from the date of expenditurn h\ 1 he Sharps until 
paid by plaintiffs. 
Delinquent | inpei ' I I X P S * -s ^0 n h 1 1'i1 
together with ihteresi; iiid penal U ^ s assessed thereon as 
provided I / 1.1 „ pr0perty taxes arcruinq f ? 1 • L?88 , and 
post •" j ud'jiiient *i\ 1 Uie r ei. 11 il 1 in 1 Jiij r 1 1 »• 1 
annum. 
,3. 
0 0 4nj 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this 
Judgment shall be supplemented and augmented in the amount of 
the Sharps' reasonable attorney's fees as established by affi-
davit and as incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of 
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any 
post-trial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution 
or otherwise, and after prevailing in any appeal. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Temporary Restraining Order entered in the above captioned 
matter by the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4, 
1986 was wrongfully issued and it is hereby lifted and dis-
solved. The Sharps are hereby awarded judgment against the 
bond posted by plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in Sep-
tember, 1986 in the amount of $2,400.00 and against the secur-
ity posted by Tracy Collins Bank with the Clerk of this Court 
in the amount of $28,570.63, and for which amounts the plain-
tiffs are not secured by the fair market value of the subject 
premises. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Lot 6 as 
described in the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches 
Phase I and the unplatted property more particularly described 
on Exhibit "A" attached hereto or such portions thereof as may 
be sufficient to pay the amounts found to be due and owing 
under this Judgment, together with interest as set forth here-
inabove and accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, be 
sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State 
of Utah, in the manner prescribed by law for such sales; that 
004a 
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c o s t s , disbur sements ar id iioiiiraiss ioi: 1 , ai id t h e n pay t o the 
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f e e s , and t h e amount owi i: ig t o t h e S h a r p s for p r i n c i p a l , i n -
heres** — <=--•
 a — e x p e n s e s of salf* and m a i n t e n a n c e t a x e s , 
assesi.**, iiiiini ;iii e pr'Nii i UIII.'.I „ ' jjei'ilij," r w 
n t e r e s ; ' : e r e o n or so mi ich of s a i d sums as s a i d proceeds 
au uidL t h e surp] u s , i f any s h a l l be a c c o u n t e d for 
:-a . . ^ r o *" i- ^  t h e CJ ei: k o f t h i s C :)ur t sub j e c : ": : : • 11 i i = 
J : u r t ' s r ; r * . r . e r o r d e r . 
* ~" . I)R DER ED. A DJUDGED AND DECREED t h a t a l l p e r -
s o n s having an i n t e r e s t ui t h e s u b j e c t p r e m i s e s s h a l l have t h e 
r i g h t , upon o r o d u c i n a s a t i s f a c t o r y proot of i n t e r e s t , t o r e -
f in; t n a t t ruin and a f t e r t h e e x p n a t i j n uf t he p e r i o d j i ».e-
l emp t inn as p r o v i d e d by law, that t h e p l a i n t i f f s above namedr 
iiid Hd, 'i I I " i ir rin und1 i I I pe r ' - j cn i I iiiniin<i IV iu-lhi MM h MI MI 
d e r t h e m o r a n y j f thorn, s h a l l br- f o r e v e r b a r r e d a n a J ,w ^ 
• c l o s e d of a l l r i g h t , t i tJ e, I i n t e r e s t and e s t a t e i n and t o the 
s u b j e c t p i: e i i i i s e s a i: i d t: I: i a t f i: • ::) n: i a i i ::I a f t • 21: 11: I • = ::i a J :i « = • i: ] * • D f I h e 
Sheriff's Deed to the subject premises that the grantees named 
therein be gi ven possession thereof. 
IT IS 1: URTHER ORDERED, AD 3 tJDGED a ND DECREED tl la t I f a 
deficiency results after due and proper application of the 
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proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are hereby awarded 
a personal judgment against Saunders, Felton, Norton and 
Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them, jointly and sev-
erally, for the full amount of such deficiency. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Sharps shall have the right, at their request, to one connec-
tion to both plaintiffs1 culinary water and sewer systems on 
White Pine Ranches Phase I for a connection fee of $2,000 
each. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a non-
exclusive appurtenant easement shall run with the land, as a 
covenant running with the land or as an equitable servitude, 
as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and benefit of 
the unplatted acreage described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto 
and incorporated herein by reference and the owners and pur-
chasers thereof (including the Sharps) and their invitees, 
guests, heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and 
for access to and the right to use as a means for ingress and 
egress for vehicular and pedestrian access over, under and 
across the private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the re-
corded final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I, recorded with 
the Summit County Recorder; and a non-exclusive appurtenant 
easement to run with the land, as a covenant running with the 
land or as an equitable servitude, as the case may be, in 
favor of and for the use and benefit of White Pine Ranches 
-6-
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Phase 1 mdl the owners and purchasers thereof fincluding the 
"harps i im! Umui i-*i r - H I ! «ui "csiiir in i n n i ->rt*si ' • i H I •* 
lines, water tank nil MIU.I s^stenia. over unde. and across Die 
subject premises n MII I he southwest corner of the unplatted 
I C ^ n . o q n i <m i I ^ i , *n r - M ( i n i n | t 1 r i * , n n | -*r?nr i n d p ] i t "it H'b < ^ ' i 
Ranches Phase I. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED <\MD DECREED t ha t the 
for White Pine Ranches Phase I wi ti: I the Summit County Record-
er * s Off ice and the non-exclus i ve easements set fo rth above 
shall r e ma i n in f u J 1 f o rc e a nd ef f ect, a i I d no i : b e af fec ted b y 
the foreclosure ordered herein, a purchase at the Sheriff's 
Sa j e, oi :i subsequent redemption of the sub j ect premises, 
other than a complete redemption thereof by the plaintiffs 
herein coupled with plai ntiffs f declaration for the ex-
tii i: i g u ish niier i t o f t: h e t: loum ^ v ; c I \ isi ^  ;» e • a a s e i n e n t :i i: :i f ai!> :)i:: • ::d: the 
unplatted acreage 
-7- 0046 
B«<ginning a t a peine South 33 degrees 43'35* I7esc along tha 
North l i n e of Lac 3, 17S„42 f e e t fron the e a s i e r ai Lacs I 
and 3 , a brass can sec by the U.S. General Land Off ice , s a i d 
b r a s s cap a l so being South ao degrees 15*46* West along 
s e c t i o n l i n e 1336.14 f ea t frca the Northeast.ccr::er of 
S e c t i o n 1, Township 2 South, Hange 3 S a s t , Sale La&a 3ase 
and Merid ian; and running thenca South 39 degrees 43«36w 
West a l o n g the North l i n e of Lot 7 and 3 2943.33 f e e t Co the 
N o r t h w e s t corner of Loc 7; thence South 00 degrees 12*23* 
Z a s t a l o n g the West l i n e of Loc 7, 1312.34 faeC to the • 
Southwest • corner oi Loc 7; thence Kerch 32 degrees 47*41" 
2 a s t a l o n g the Souch l i n e of Lot 7, 332.67 fae t ; thence 
North 61 degrees oa^O* l a s t 1355.90 i e e t ; thence North 47 
d e g r e e s 33'IS" 2asc 462.75 faec; thence North. 4^ 2 decrees 
4 4 , 4 0 , f Zas t 35.63 feec to the po int of beginning. 
LESS and excepting White Pins Zszdz&s, Phase I , a Planes! 3esicsnfiial 
Development, according to the of f ic ia l p lat thereof on r i le arc of 
record i n the Siszmit County Seccrdsr's Offica, State of Utah. 
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OPINION 
BENCH, Judge; 
Plai n t i f f s a p p eal f i o m a j u d gin en t i i:i f a vo i: 
of defendants in an action for breach of con-
tract and slander of title. Plaintiffs also appeal 
the district court's determination that a tern-
lorary restraining order was wrongfully 
ssued, entitling defendants to damages from 
njunction bonds posted by, and on behalf of, 
.llaintiffs. We affirm, the judgment on the 
:ontract, but reverse the award of damages 
against the injunction bonds. 
This dispute arises from the sale of appro-
ximately 60 acres of land near Park City, 
Utah, owned by John C. and Geraldine Y. 
Sharp ("sellers"). Plaintiff White Pine 
Ranches, a general partnership consisting of 
Leon H. Saunders, Robert Feiton, Kenneth R. 
Norton, and Paul H. Landes ("buyers7'), 
purchased the property on July 16, 1981, for 
the purpose of constructing a "Planned Unit 
Development" (PUD)2 of four- or five-acre 
lots and an internal roadway. Buyers paid 
$620,000 down on a total purchase price of 
$1,583,055.30, and executed a trust deed and 
note providing for equal annual installment 
payments of $192,611.06 on the balance due. 
An "Offer to Purchase" and "Memorandum 
if Closing Terms" were also executed 
hereafter referred to as the "contract"), and 
nciuded the following provisions: (1) upon 
eceipt of the down payment and recordation 
)f a "PUD Plat and Declaration of Coven-
ants, Conditions and Restrictions," three lots 
of buyers1 choice together with the internal 
roadway connecting the lots to the county 
"oad would be released from the trust deed; 
(2) after recordation and upon receipt of each 
$140,000 in principal, one PUD lot of buyers' 
choice would be released from the trust deed; 
(3) sellers would grant Summit County a strip 
of land to widen the county road, or, if the 
road was shown to be inaccurately platted, to 
grant to the county the road as it existed; (4) 
sellers would warrant marketable title subject 
only to easements and reservations of record; 
(5) buyers would provide sellers with a water 
and sewer connection at a pro rata cost, at 
such time as the connections became available; 
(6) buyers would sell 50 acre-feet of irriga-
tion water to sellers for the discounted cost of 
$100,000 cash; (7) buyers would be responsible 
for all taxes and assessments after assuming 
possession of the premises; (8) failure to make 
the annual installment payments within thirty 
days of the annual anniversary date would 
constitute a default; and (9) in the event of a 
breach or default, the defaulting party would 
pay all expenses, including reasonable attorney 
fees, incurred in enforcing any obligation or 
right under the contract. 
Buyers made installment payments in 1982, 
1983, 1984, and a partial payment in 1985. 
Buyers also made certain improvements to the 
property and the internal roadway at a cost of 
over a million dollars, funded in part by a 
construction loan from Tracy Collins Bank & 
Trust Company ("Tracy Collins"). On or 
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about November 23, 1983, sellers executed a 
"Consent to Record" with respect to buyers' 
plat describing "Phase I" of the project, which 
involved six lots and the roadway. The plat 
and a "Declaration of Protective Covenants" 
were officially recorded on December 23, 
1983. The plat indicated that the internal 
roadway was to be private, in contravention of 
sellers' intent to have the roadway dedicated 
to public use. 
Although sellers requested the trustee on 
January 18, 1984, to release and reconvey lots 
1 through 5, no mention of the roadway was 
made, and no reconveyance was recorded until 
March 28, 1986. Meanwhile, property taxes 
for lot 6 and the unplatted property became 
due on November 30, 1984. Of the $4,725 
assessed for taxes, buyers paid only $1,515.24. 
Buyers also paid only a portion of the instal-
lment payment due in June 1985. 
Sellers subsequently recorded a notice of 
default on September 16, 1985, and gave 
notice of a trustee's sale of lot 6, the internal 
roadway, and all the unplatted property. 
Buyers filed this action on September 4, 1986, 
the day before the scheduled trustee's sale, 
and were granted an order temporarily restr-
aining the sale. The initial temporary restrai-
ning order required a cash bond in the amount 
of $2,400, which buyers posted. The parties 
thereafter stipulated to an injunction pending 
trial, and the district court imposed a $50,000 
injunction bond. The bond was posted by 
Tracy Collins acting as surety for buyers, in 
an attempt to protect its security interest on 
the construction loan issued to buyers. 
In their complaint, buyers sought specific 
performance of certain obligations under the 
contract, specifically, the release of lot 6, the 
internal roadway, and 7.35 acres of the unpl-
atted property. Buyers also sought damages 
arising from sellers' alleged breach of cont-
ract. Sellers counterclaimed, asserting that 
buyers had breached the contract. They sought 
dissolution of the injunction, damages for its 
wrongful issuance, an order of judicial forec-
losure on the property, and recovery on the 
trust deed note. 
A bench trial was held on January 28-29 
and March 22-25, 1988. The trial court held 
that buyers had materially breached the cont-
ract by failing to pay property taxes on lot 6 
and the unplatted acreage, and by failing to 
satisfy their 1985 and 1986 installment oblig-
ations. The court further held that the contr-
actual breach occurred before any alleged 
breach by sellers, and that further perform-
ance by sellers was excused after buyers' 
breach. Buyers also failed to request release of 
lots until after their own breach had already 
occurred, facts which the court believed affe-
cted the credibility of buyers' claims. In con-
trast, sellers were found to have substantially 
complied with the terms of the contract, and 
that the recordation of the Declaration of 
UTAH ADVA 
Protective Covenants and the Consent to 
Record constituted a release of the roadway. 
Judgment was entered for sellers in the 
amount of $759,415.63. This amount included 
$144,088.75 in attorney fees, which were 
awarded under the terms of the trust deed and 
note and the contract. 
After finding that buyers had breached the 
contract, the trial court determined that the 
temporary restraining order against sellers had 
been wrongfully issued. The court then dete-
rmined that the appraised fair market value of 
the property upon which sellers were entitled 
to foreclose was $728,445. That sum was 
deducted from the total judgment, leaving 
sellers undersecured in the amount of 
$30,970.63. The court awarded sellers that 
amount against the bonds by entering judg-
ment on the $2,400 cash bond, in full, and 
$28,570.63 against the bond posted by Tracy 
Collins. The court also determined that four 
percent of the attorney fees incurred in 
defense of the lawsuit could be attributed to 
defending against the wrongfully issued inju-
nction, and awarded attorney fees against the 
bonds in the amount of $5,763.55. Buyers and 
the surety have brought this consolidated 
appeal to challenge the respective judgments 
against them. 
We first consider the appeal brought by 
buyers, who argue that the trial court erred in 
concluding that they, not sellers, breached the 
contract. Buyers claim entitlement to specific 
performance and damages, and argue that 
sellers are precluded from recovering attorney 
fees. Buyers also claim that the trial court 
erred in concluding that they granted to sellers 
an easement over the roadway and that the 
temporary restraining order had been wrong-
fully issued. 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
At the conclusion of trial, the court made 
oral findings encompassing eight transcribed 
pages. Thereafter, the court issued its judg-
ment accompanied by 104 separate findings of 
fact. Buyers' brief lists over two pages of 
issues and subissues. Although buyers state 
that "the issues presented in this appeal are 
questions of law reviewable by an appellate 
court for correctness," we conclude, after 
scrutinizing those issues, that buyers are esse-
ntially challenging the trial court's findings of 
fact. 
Buyers argue that sellers breached the con-
tract by failing to make ail the required reco-
nveyances and that this breach was never 
excused by buyers' failure to make specific 
requests for those releases. Buyers also dispute 
the trial court's finding that the evidence 
"established that the parties by both mutual 
intent and agreement granted to the Defend-
ants the use of the roadway." Buyers further 
contest the finding that sellers substantially 
performed their obligations under the cont-
CE REPORTS 
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ract. Ail of these "legal issues/ however; 
strike at the trial court's determination of 
whether there was a material breach of cont-
ract, and if so, when, and by whom. Such 
questions constitute issues of fact for the fact 
finder. See Sjoberg v. Kravik, 759 P.2d 966, 
969 (Mont. 1988); W'asserburger v. American 
Scientific Chern., Inc., 267 Or. 77, 514 P.2d 
1097, 1099 (1973) (en banc); see also American 
Petrofina Co. v. D & L Oil Supply, inc., 283 
Or. 183, 583 P.2d 521, 528 (1978) (substantial 
performance under a contract is a question of 
fact). 
Our standard few overtui ning factual find-
ings is a rigorous one- we ma> not set aside 
such findings unless they are clearly erroneous. 
Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball 786 P.2d 760, 
761 (Utah 1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). To 
establish clear error, "|a|n appellant must 
marshal the evidence in support of the find-
ings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so 
lacking in support as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence,' ...." In re Bartell, 776 
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). This 
burden "is a heavy one, reflective of the fact 
that we do not sit to retry cases submitted on 
disputed facts." Id. at 886. Accordingly, when 
an appellant fails to carry its burden of mar-
shaling the evidence, "we refuse to consider 
the merits of challenges to the findings and 
accept the findings as valid." Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 
(UtahCt.App. 1989). 
We are thus obliged to consider the findings 
from the standpoint of the supporting evid-
ence and not from "appellant's view of the 
way he or she believes the facts should have 
been found." Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 
150 (Utah 1987). Since buyers have not mar-
shaled the evidence in support of those find-
ings, but merely argue that there is evidence 
contradicting them, they have failed to dem-
onstrate that the findings are against the clear 
weight of the evidence. We must therefore 
accept the findings as valid and affirm the | 
judgment. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
With respect to the award of attorney iecs, 
"the court may award reasonable fees in ace- , 
ordance with the terms of the parties' agree-
ment." Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 
836 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Trayner v. i 
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984) (per 
curiam)). Although the interpretation of una-
mbiguous contractual terms is a question of 
law to which the trial court's ruling is affo-
rded no particular deference on appeal, Wilburn 
v. Interstate Elec, 748 P.2d 582, 584-
85 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, dismissed, 774 
P.2d 1149 (Utah 1989), when those terms are 
determined to provide for an award of atto-
rney fees, they are to be "awarded as a matter 
of legal right." Cobabef 780 P.2d at 836 
(quoting Cabrera v. Cornell. 694 P.2d 622., 
625 (Utah 1985)). 
The contract provides that "the defaulting 
party shall pay all expenses of enforcing the 
same or any right arising out of breach or 
default thereof, including reasonable attor-
neys' fees, whether incurred with or without 
suit and both before and after judgment." We 
conclude, as the trial court implicitly did, that 
this provision is unambiguous. Based on the 
court's determination that buyers breached the 
trust deed, trust deed note, and the contract, 
the trial court properly ruled that sellers were 
entitled to their attorney fees reasonably inc-
urred. See, e.g., Dixon \ • Stoddard, 765 P 2d 
879, 881 (Utah 1988). 
The amount of such an award is within the 
trial court's discretion, Cobabe, 780 P.2d at 
836, but must be reasonable, Canyon Country 
Store v. Braceyf 781 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 
1989), and supported by adequate evidence. 
Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1233 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). At the court's instruction, 
sellers' counsel submitted an affidavit and 
supporting documents as evidence of reason-
ableness. We perceive no abuse of discretion 
in the trial court's determination that this 
affidavit, never rebutted, was sufficient to 
support an award of fees. See id.; see also 
Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P.2d 
1039, 1040 (Utah 1975). 
THE INJUNCTION BONDS 
The Commissioner of Financial Institutions 
("Commissioner"), as receiver for Tracy 
Collins, appeals the judgment against the inj-
I unction bonds. The Commissioner seeks to 
avoid liability by arguing for the first time on 
appeal that the posting of the surety bond was 
an ultra vires act by Tracy Collins. 
Although issues not raised below cannot 
generally be considered on appeal, see James 
v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), the Commissioner urges us to create an 
exception to this rule under the theory of 
"adverse domination." This theory provides 
:ha as long as a corporation is controlled or 
, Linated" by wrongdoers against whom a 
.a,.'-: o\ action exists, the statute of limitat-
ion., is tolled because the wrongdoers cannot 
, be expected to bring an action against thems-
elves. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hudson, 
tn F. Supp. 1039, 1042 (D. Kan, 1987), 
I Because Tracy Collins did not have the 
power to act as a surety, the Commissioner 
alleges, the bank's officers would have been 
subjected to liability had they asserted the 
ultra vires claim at trial. Therefore, so the 
argument goes, the Commissioner, as receiver, 
should now be permitted under the theory of 
adverse domination to assert the claim of ultra 
vires on appeal 
Although there are exceptions to the rule 
prohibiting consideration of issues for the first 
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time on appeal, they are few in number. See 
State v. Webb, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 41, 47-
48 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (e.g., exceptional 
circumstances, plain error, liberty interests). It 
appears that such exceptions are to be applied 
only when gross injustice resulting from app-
lication of the rule overwhelms its purpose-
that being to correct errors at trial, avoiding 
"a merry-go-round of litigation." Bundy v. 
Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 
1984) (quoting Simpson v. General Motors 
Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 303, 470 P.2d 399, 401 
(Utah 1970)). 
The Commissioner has brought to our att-
ention no exceptional circumstance to support 
the carving out of yet another exception to the 
rules of appellate review. Although the Com-
missioner urges us to adopt its approach by 
noting that it was not a party below, buyers 
were likewise deprived of the opportunity to 
submit the ultra vires issue to the trial court 
and have it resolved without the necessity of 
this appeal. Since the Commissioner offers no 
authority for extending the theory of adverse 
domination beyond the limitation of actions 
against corporate wrongdoers, and we see no 
other reason to do so, we decline to consider 
its claim of ultra vires. Accord Wallace Bank 
& Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 40 Idaho 
712, 237 P. 284, 287 (1925) (ultra vires may 
not be asserted for the first time on appeal). 
We next address the Commissioner's claim 
that the trial court improperly awarded atto-
rney fees incurred in resisting the temporary 
restraining order. The trial court accepted 
sellers' calculation that four percent of their 
total attorney fees of $144,088.75 were spent 
defending against the "injunction."3 The trial 
court then awarded $5,763.55 of those fees 
against the bonds. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(c) provides that: 
Except as otherwise provided by 
law, no restraining order or preli-
minary injunction shall issue except 
upon the giving of security by the 
applicant, in such sum as the court 
deems proper, for the payment of 
such costs and damages as may be 
incurred or suffered by any party 
who is found to have been wrong-
fully enjoined or restrained. 
Our supreme court has determined that 
"damages" subject to recovery under this rule 
include the attorney fees of the party wrong-
fully enjoined. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. 
Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 
P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 1984). We have since 
extended that recovery to attorney fees incu-
rred as the result of a wrongfully issued tem-
porary restraining order. See Beard v. 
Dugdale, 741 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). When attorney fees are incurred in 
defending against wrongfully obtained injun-
ctive relief and also against an underlying 
lawsuit, it is appropriate to determine how 
much of the total fees are attributable to res-
isting the injunction. See id.; see also Artistic 
Hairdressers, Inc. v. Levy, 87 Nev. 313, 486 
P.2d 482, 484 (1971) (only the attorney fees 
directly related to dissolution of the wrongful 
injunction are recoverable). We therefore 
affirm the trial court's award of attorney fees 
against the bonds. 
We last address the Commissioner's argu-
ment that the trial court used an incorrect 
measure in awarding damages under rule 
65A(c) against the injunction bonds. The trial 
court calculated damages by adding principal 
($371,739.35), interest ($203,664.50), late fees 
($14,869.57), taxes ($20,368.62), attorney fees 
($144,469.75), trustee's fees ($1,803.80), and 
costs ($2,881.04) for a total of $759,796.63. 
The court next considered the testimony at 
trial of a real property appraiser who deter-
mined that the fair market value of the unc-
onveyed property was $17,500 to $20,000 per 
acre at the time the temporary restraining 
order was imposed. The trial court then found 
that the value of the property on the date of 
judgment was $20,000 per acre, totalling 
$728,445.00. Since the value of the property as 
collateral was less than the total judgment, the 
trial court found that buyers were undersec-
ured and awarded the difference ($30,970.63) 
as damages for the wrongfully issued injunc-
tion. 
The Commissioner claims that this calcula-
tion was erroneous, and asserts that the 
correct measure of damages is /rthe reduction 
or diminution in the value of the security 
during the period of restraint." Glens Falls 
Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 83 Nev. 196, 427 
P.2d 1, 4 (1967). See also Global Contact 
Lens, Inc. v. Knight, 254 So. 2d 807, 809 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1971). We agree. Although 
sellers were restrained from foreclosing the 
property for approximately two years, they 
retained both the trust deed note and the 
unconveyed property during that time. The 
trial court found that the value of the property 
did not diminish in those two years. Any 
measure of damages other than a comparison 
of the fair market value of the property before 
and after the injunction is thus incorrect. 
Sellers argue, however, that buyers' argu-
ment ignores the concept of "present value." 
They contend that the award of interest under 
the judgment is inadequate, under the assu-
mption that they would have had available the 
interest earning capacity of the foreclosure sale 
proceeds had the sale been held as scheduled. 
Alternatively, they suggest that an appraisal 
showing the value of the property in 1988 to 
be the same as that in 1986 actually represents 
a decrease in value when the effect of inflation 
is taken into account. Aside from the specul-
ative nature of such claims, sellers' interest 
losses on the trust deed note were taken into 
consideration and awarded as part of the total 
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judgment. Interest was awarded at the rate of 
twelve percent on the unpaid principal, eigh-
teen percent on the payments in default, and 
also included a four percent late payment 
charge. Surely those charges more than com-
pensated sellers for the interest-bearing pot-
ential of money or the effects of inflation 
during the two-year period. 
In any event, the Commissioner is correct in 
asserting that "recoverable damages under 
such a bond are those that arise from the 
operation of the injunction itself and not from 
damages occasioned by the suit independently 
of the injunction." Beard, 741 P.2d at 969 
(quoting Lever Bros, Co. \ International 
Chem. Workers Union, 554 F.2d 115, 120 (4th 
Cir. 1976)). On that basis, the interest accrued 
on the trust deed note during the delay in the 
sale of the property may be awarded in the 
judgment, as was done in this case, but cannot 
also be attributed as damages under the inju-
nction bond. See Glens Fails, 427 P.2d at 4. 
Since sellers did not demonstrate any damages 
attributable to the imposition of the injunction 
other than a portion of their attorney fees, the 
award of damages against the bonds must be 
reversed 
In summary, we affirm the judgment on the 
contract. We reverse the award of damages 
against the injunction bonds, except for the 
attorney fees. Such fees are to be assessed 
against the bonds in a proportion to be dete-
rmined by the trial court. 
Affirmed in part, reversed, in part, and 
remanded. No costs awarded. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
John Farr Larson, Judge 
1. John Farr Larson, Senior juvenile Court judge, 
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann- §78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989). 
2. 'Planned unit development* is generally defined 
as a private residential development on acreage of 
certain minimum size, usually large enough to con-
stitute a new community. See Stevens v. Essex 
Junction Zoning Bd., 139 Vt. 297, 428 A.2d 1100, 
1103(1981). 
3. The reference to an * injunction* appears to refer 
to both the temporary restraining order and the 
stipulated, preiiminary i nj unction 
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